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The federal income tax treatment of rent has received little at-
tention, presumably because it generally is viewed as obvious and
simple.' In fact, the economics of the taxation of rent generally are
misperceived. A clear view of these economics shows that the cur-
rent rules controlling the taxation of rent are seriously defective
and require reform. Economic rent should be greater when a de-
preciating asset is new; yet current law respects level rent stated in
long-term leases.2 This mistaxation distorts economic behavior and
, The basic analysis of leasing in this Article was first suggested in George Mundstock,
The Mistaxation of Rent: Eliminating the Lease/Loan Distinction, 53 Tax Notes 353 (Oct.
21, 1991).
The current taxation of other long-term, non-loan contracts also is defective. For exam-
ple, current law allows remarkably generous deferral of service income to cash basis taxpay-
ers. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. A consideration of these problems is beyond the
scope of this Article. An argument can be made that reform of the taxation of rent should
be deferred pending a general reform of the taxation of long-term contracts. However, cur-
rent law with regard to leases is particularly troubling. Since the long-term relationship that
most closely resembles a lease is a loan, and since current law with regard to loans is not as
defective as with regard to leases, the lease/loan distinction presents real manipulation
problems. See infra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3. After all, leases are commonly regarded as a tax-
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loses revenue. Unfortunately, once the current defects are identi-
fied, it is hard to see a workable reform, as there is little data on
economic rent. Reform becomes possible, however, if one applies
the present value and related concepts developed in the loan con-
text to the taxation of rent. These same concepts provide insight
into transactions similar to leases, like sales of terms for years.
This Article provides that analysis..
Part I discusses the taxation of rent. It shows that the economic
rent of depreciable property should be greater when the asset is
newer - and, thus, presumably, more useful - and lower later -
when the property is older and less useful. Notwithstanding these
underlying economics, most long-term leases state level, or near-
level, rent. In a level-rent lease; the lessor, in effect, lends the rent
"shortfall" (as compared to economic rent) in the early years of the
lease, to be repaid out of "excess" rent in the later years. Current
law generally respects a level-rent lease. This mistaxation of rent
undertaxes lessors and overtaxes lessees, in present value terms.
When the lessor is in a higher tax bracket than the lessee, the cur-
rent mistaxation effects a net reduction in taxes. Since taxpayers
will organize their behavior to take advantage of this mistaxation
of rent, tax-favored leasing is encouraged and revenue is lost
needlessly.
A perfect reform would tax both the economic rent and any loan
hidden in a long-term lease that does not state economic rent. This
would be quite complicated - and probably unworkable - since
there is little data on economic rent. It is possible to devise a work-
able reform, however,. by using the present value, compounding,
and related concepts that Congress increasingly uses in the taxa-
tion of loans. One applies these concepts to the taxation of long-
term leases by comparing a given lease with a loan that provides
the same payments. The economics of this loan should be very
driven form of financing. See infra Part I.B.2. More generally, it probably is easier for tax-
payers to take advantage of defects in the current law with regard to the taxation of leases
than these other defects without changing the economics of transactions (cash flows and
risk) materially. Additionally, since the current defects in the taxation of leases arise from a
failure to account properly for the return on the capital invested in the leased property at
the outset, as discussed infra Part I.B.3, the problems considered here are likely to be less of
a concern with long-term service contracts, which are the principal other type of long-term
contract; others include licensing, construction, and supply contracts, which customarily in-
volve capital. In sum, it seems best to proceed with an examination of leasing.
19921
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close to the economics of the parallel lease. Thus, taxing a long-
term lease as if it were a loan proxy should radically reduce the
current mistaxation. This simple reform, by drawing on related re-
cent developments in the law, would be readily understandable by
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service").
Many lease transactions present the issue of how any unrealized
gain or loss in the leased property should be taxed to the lessor.
Current law taxes a portion of any gain through reduced deprecia-
tion over the lease term. Similarly, a portion of any loss is taxed
through increased depreciation over the lease term. Part II points
out that the problem of when gain or loss should be realized is
virtually intractable, since there is no economic notion of realiza-
tion to use as a benchmark in evaluating tax realization rules. In
particular, the loan proxy suggested for taxing rent makes little
sense as a realization rule. Fortunately, the proposal can be ad-
justed to provide realization rules that parallel the current rules
and are quite acceptable.
Most of the analyses of long-term leasing focus on the lessor's
use of non-economic accelerated depreciation. Part III shows that,
due to this focus, these analyses are incomplete. Once one takes
the mistaxation of rent into account, lessor accelerated deprecia-
tioi is less troubling. Moreover, the proposed loan proxy reform
facilitates dealing with accelerated depreciation.
Part IV considers transactions that are similar to long-term
leases, primarily sales of terms for years. These transactions are
also mistaxed under current law. Loan concepts motivate a simple
reform here as well. The impact of inflation, on this Article's basic
analysis is considered in Part V. Part VI then discusses how the
recently resuscitated capital gains preference affects this Article's
conclusions. Part VII briefly concludes.
I. MISTAXATION OF RENT
Current law generally respects level rent provided in long-term
leases. In fact, economic rent of depreciable property probably is
greatest when the property is new. Thus, current law troublingly
mistaxes rent. This mistaxation results in undertaxation when the
lessor is subject to higher tax rates than the lessee. As a result,
taxpayers can organize their affairs so as to exploit the mistaxa-
tion, which results in an unjustified tax interference with economic
behavior and in a loss of revenue. The perfect reform, taxing eco-
[Vol. 11:683
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nomic rent and any loans hidden in non-economic rent structures,
is quite complicated. Fortunately, taxing leases as if they were
loans is a close and workable proxy for this reform.
A. Basic Assumptions
Rent is the compensation paid by a lessee to a lessor for the use
of the lessor's property. Rent pays the lessor for (i) the lessor's
financial costs of owning the property and (ii) for any related non-
financial services. This Article is concerned only with economic
problems associated with the financial side of rent, and, conse-
quently, ignores the services side in the economic analysis. 3 Thus,
repairs and maintenance are not reflected in this discussion. This
Article focuses on leases of depreciating tangible property, includ-
ing structures. No account is taken of intangibles or mineral and
other depletable properties. The analysis with regard to land that
is not subject to depletion is noted where appropriate.
It is important to understand the economics of rent in order to
tax rent.4 If the tax law does not tax rent in accordance with its
' Services are ignored only for purposes of the basic economic analysis. The discussion
infra, Part I.B.5, takes services into account for purposes of this Article's reform proposal. It
is reasonable to ignore services in the economic analysis when the lessee can purchase the
services at the same price, and with the same tax treatment, from either the lessor or a third
party. This is customarily assumed in the economics literature. See, e.g., Merton Miller &
Charles Upton, Leasing, Buying, and the Cost of Capital Services, 31 J. Fin. 761, 761-62
(1976). Since this assumption seems reasonable, it also is adopted here. Not all economists
agree, however. See, e.g., David Flath, The Economics of Short-Term Leasing, 18 Econ. Inq.
247 (1980). To the extent this assumption is wrong, the analysis in this Article must be
appropriately limited.
I This Article is limited in many ways. It looks only at leasing and similar transactions
involving taxable unrelated businesses not subject to the hobby loss rules. Thus, for exam-
ple, no account is taken of issues presented by gratuitous transfers of interests in property.
All rent is potentially deductible. This Article looks only at the basic tax accounting for
leasing and related transactions with no foreign connection under the regular income taxes.
No account is taken of the impact of leasing on (or the impact on leasing of) such provisions
as the minimum taxes, the tax on tax-exempts' unrelated business income, the (now re-
pealed) investment tax credit, the foreign tax credit, the depletion allowance, the at-risk and
passive activity loss rules, and the rules controlling utilization of net operating losses. This
Article does not consider the impact of rent guarantees on the analysis, since the problems
presented by guarantees extend well beyond the leasing context.
As discussed below, leasing is a close substitute for borrowing. Many are concerned that
borrowing presents problems with respect to the current "double taxation" of corporations
- where income is taxed to the corporation as earned and, again, to the shareholders as
dividends or capital gains. Thus, leasing presents double tax problems. See U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems - Taxing Busi-
688 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 11:683
economics, problems arise. For example, if two lease transactions
reflect identical economic rent but are taxed differently, taxpayers
will enter into the lease transaction that provides the more
favorable tax treatment, even if that lease otherwise makes less ec-
onomic sense. The different tax treatments reduce revenues and
distort economic behavior. Rent should be taxed in accordance
with its economics.5
B. Rent in a Riskless World (with No Change)
1. The Accelerated Nature of Rent
The theoretical economics of rent are relatively straightforward.
In the case of depreciating property, the rent generally should be
greater when the property is new.
Some simplifying. assumptions, to be relaxed later, are helpful.
Assume that markets work perfectly and that the tax system has
no effect on prices, prices do not change, transactions are costless,6
there is no risk,7 and all investments provide the same pre-tax re-
turn. Also, assume that the tax system taxes interest' as it accrues
economically and that the tax system provides deductions for de-
preciation that exactly match the depreciating assets' decline in
value, i.e., that the tax law provides "economic depreciation."9 In-
ness Income Once 53-54 (1992). This Article does not consider any of these issues, but since
these issues are no different for leasing than debt, this Article's focus does not undermine
its analysis.
For a more complete exposition of the analysis underlying this policy criterion, see
George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1179, 1183
(1987).
6 This assumption is somewhat troubling, since some suggest that transaction costs play a
significant role in the leaseAoan distinction. See, e.g., Flath, supra note 3, at 248-55.
To elaborate, there is no fluctuation in relative market prices, all obligations always are
paid, and there is no theft or destruction of property.
' For simplicity, this Article uses "interest" to include original issue discount. The discus-
sion also assumes that all indebtedness bears adequate interest for tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 1274.
There is no one "economic depreciation" for most properties. A given property's value
at a point in time depends on how the property has been used and how it has been main-
tained. For example, a car that has been driven hard over long distances without an oil
change is likely to be worth less than an equally old car that has been driven only a little
with perfect maintenance. This limitation on the notion of economic depreciation is particu-
larly relevant here, as some economists believe that a business' decision whether to lease or
buy a given property is influenced by the economics of the different effects that owning and
leasing have on the quality of use and maintenance of the property. See, e.g., Clifford Smith
& MacDonald Wakeman, Determinants of Corporate Leasing Policy, 40 J. Fin. 895 (1985).
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flation is not considered until Part V.
With these assumptions, it is possible to determine what market
or economic rent should be. Under the perfect markets assump-
tion, economic rent of a property for a year should be sufficiently
high to compensate potential lessors for their total economic cost
associated with such property for the year. Otherwise, these lessors
would sell their properties or use the properties themselves rather
than rent. Similarly, looking at leasing from the perspective of po-
tential lessees, the economic rent for a year should not exceed the
total cost of owning the property. Otherwise, these lessees would
just buy the properties themselves. Thus, since the rent should be
neither less nor more than the total cost of owning the property,
the rent should equal this total cost. This rent makes lessors and
lessees indifferent between leasing and owning, which is required
by the perfect markets and related assumptions. 10
What is the total economic or financial cost for a year of owning
leased property? There are two component costs. One cost of own-
ing the property is the loss of the investment in the property due
to the property losing value - economic depreciation. Further, the
funds invested in the property could be invested otherwise, e.g., in
a bank account earning interest. Thus, another cost of owning the
property is lost alternative profit - for convenience, this is re-
ferred to here as "economic interest." Consequently, under the in-
stant assumptions, economic rent exactly equals economic depreci-
ation plus economic interest." This straightforward statement
leads to some potentially surprising results, as can be seen with an
example.
Assume that all indebtedness bears 10% interest.' A machine
costs 30.72.11 The machine is purchased and placed in service on
the first day of Year 1, at which time it begins to lose value on a
straight-line basis over ten years, after which the machine is
Nevertheless, the instant analysis, as is customary in the literature, does not reflect this
additional complexity in order to be consistent with the assumption, discussed supra note 3,
that maintenance costs are fixed and consequently can be ignored. See, e.g., Miller & Upton,
supra note 3, at 764.
o See Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at 761-67.
" See Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at 761-67.
" In this Article, all interest and discount rates are annual yields.
'" This price was arbitrarily chosen in order to generate the level rent of 5 in Table II.
1992]
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no salvage value.' 4 The following table presents
TABLE I 5
(3)
Depreciation
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.07
(4)
Net Income
3.07
2.77
2.46
2.15
1.84
1.54
1.23
0.92
0.61
0.31
The rent in the second column is the only rent that is consistent
with the straight-line economic depreciation. Rent less deprecia-
tion is shown in the fourth column. The fifth column is the original
cost less accumulated depreciation, which balance is the lessor's
outstanding investment in the machine. Note that the rent in Ta-
ble I assures that the annual net income on the asset is exactly
10% of the net investment. Thus, the column one economic rent
assures that the lessor earns exactly the assumed 10% annual re-
turn on its remaining investment (column five). This is the rent
the lessor would charge in a series of one-year leases commencing
at the beginning of each year.
This simple example is the heart of this Article. It shows that,
even if one assumes that economic depreciation is straight-line,
rent is not. In the early years of the asset's life, the lessor has a
greater investment in the property, so that the interest component
of rent, and, consequently, the rent, are greater in these years. For
convenience, such a rent structure is referred to as "accelerated."
The conclusion that rent should be greater when a machine is new
makes sense. Since a newer machine probably works more reliably
To simplify calculations, it is assumed that, on the last day of the year, (a) all deprecia-
tion occurs instantaneously and (b) all rent accrues economically and, for tax purposes, in-
stantaneously, and is payable.
,' In all tables, numbers may not add up properly due to rounding.
(1)
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(2)
Rent
6.14
5.84
5.53
5.22
4.92
4.61
4.30
3.99
3.69
3.38
(5)
Net
Investment
30.72
27.65
24.58
21.51
18.43
15.36
12.29
9.22
6.14
3.07
[Vol. 11:683
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and efficiently and, thus, is more productive, one would pay more
rent for a newer machine. The use of a newer machine simply is
worth more.
The essentially accelerated nature of rent for depreciable prop-
erty can be seen from the other direction. One can look at what
economic depreciation would have to look like if one believed that
rent is level. Table II shows what the economic depreciation would
be if the economic rent of a machine that cost 30.72 were level over
ten years:
TABLE II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net
Year Rent Depreciation Net Income Investment
1 5.00 1.93 3.07 30.72
2 5.00 2.12 2.88 28.80
3 5.00 2.33 2.67 26.67
4 5.00 2.57 2.43 24.34
5 5.00 2.82 2.18 21.78
6 5.00 3.10 1.90 18.95
7 5.00 3.42 1.58 15.85
8 5.00 3.76 1.24 12.43
9 5.00 4.13 0.87 8.68
10 5.00 4.55 0.45 4.54
Level rent implies depreciation that is much smaller in the early
years of an asset's life, and much greater in the later years. 16
It is helpful to note that the instant analysis is consistent with
level rent for non-depreciating undeveloped land. In this case, the
lessor's investment is constant from year to year. Land rent must
compensate the lessor for only one cost: loss of the use of the
money invested in the land, i.e., economic interest. Since the in-
vestment stays constant, economic interest and rent stay constant.
In a lease of depreciating property, the net investment declines,
and, therefore, the interest component of rent declines, i.e., is ac-
celerated, so that rent will be accelerated unless the depreciation is
very slow indeed.
The true economic rent can only be determined empirically.
While there have been few studies of rent, a number of studies of
"6 See Marvin Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 140-45 (6th ed. 1991).
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economic depreciation conclude that economic depreciation gener-
ally is straight-line or faster.1 7 Thus, it seems quite likely that eco-
nomic rent generally is quite accelerated. These empirical works
also note widely different patterns of depreciation between differ-
ent types of assets, 8 implying that economic rent also must be
quite variable.
The very accelerated nature of economic rent when the economic
depreciation is fast can be seen in the context of the ongoing exam-
ple. Assume that the economic depreciation of the machine that
cost 30.72 is 150% declining balance switching to straight line
when more favorable over ten years, with no salvage value or aver-
aging convention. Then, matters are as follows:
TABLE III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net
Year Rent Depreciation Net Income Investment
1 7.68 4.61 3.07 30.72
2 6.53 3.92 2.61 26.11
3 5.55 3.33 2.22 22.20
4 4.72 2.83 1.89 18.87
5 4.28 2.67 1.60 16.04
6 4.01 2.67 1.34 13.36
7 3.74 2.67 1.07 10.69
8 3.47 2.67 0.80 8.02
9 3.21 2.67 0.53 5.35
10 2.94 2.67 0.27 2.67
Rapid economic depreciation is associated with quite accelerated
economic rent.
2. Multi- Year Leases
The discussion, thus far, has not focussed on the term of a lease.
Leases can extend over many years. The basic analysis above pro-
vides insights into multi-year leases. 9 Most importantly, it shows
"7 Charles R. Hulten & Frank C. Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depreciation, in
Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income From Capital 81, 112 (Charles R.
Hulten ed. 1981).
See Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 17, at 112.
The discussion assumes that the lease cannot be cancelled by the lessee without pen-
alty, as discussed more fully infra.
[Vol. 11:683
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that level-rent leases, a common practice, 2° result in considerable
mistaxation. This mistaxation troublingly encourages revenue-los-
ing leases between low-bracket lessees and high-bracket lessors.
A multi-year lease can provide annual rent equal to the eco-
nomic rent for each year. This is not the only rent structure ac-
ceptable to the lessor and lessee, however. Under the instant as-
sumptions, they should be indifferent between rent structures as
long as the lessor earns a market return, or, equivalently, the lessee
pays a market return. For example, even when economic rent is
accelerated, the lessor should be willing to take an appropriate
level rent.21 If so, the lessor is not receiving adequate rent in the
early years of the lease, and is receiving excess rent in later years.
In effect, the lessor is lending the economic rent shortfall in the
early years, and the loan is repaid with interest in the later years.
Current law applies this hidden loan analysis, but only when a
lease explicitly provides that rent is to be paid after the period to
which it relates under the terms of the lease.
This hidden loan analysis can be illustrated in the context of the
ongoing example. Assume that the machine in Table I is rented for
five years. The economic rent would be the same as in Table I. A
five-year level rent structure that has the same present value as
the first five years of this economic rent and, therefore, is
equivalent to the lessor and lessee, would provide rent of 5.59 per
year.2 3 If the Table I machine is rented for this level rent, however,
the tax consequences of the loan from the lessor to the lessee that
20 Albert F. Reisman & Charles W. Mooney, Drafting, Negotiating, and Construing the
Equipment Lease - An Overview, in Equipment Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 1, 57 (Bruce
E. Fritch, Albert F. Reisman & Ian Shrank eds., 3d ed. 1988).
2' Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at 777. If the lessor anticipates a need for cash flow prior
to that provided in the lease, under the assumptions at this point in this Article, it can plan
to sell interests in the property, and in the lessor's rights under the lease, at a zero transac-
tion cost when it needs cash.
" I.R.C. § 467(a).
22 In the real world, the lessor would factor its tax treatment into its pricing analysis. See
James C. Ahlstrom & Iris C. Engelson, Economics of Leveraged Leasing, in Equipment
Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 561 (Bruce E. Fritch, Albert F. Reisman & Ian Shrank eds.,
3d ed. 1988). This is ignored here for two reasons. First, since the analysis generally assumes
a perfect tax system, taxes generally should have no effect on prices. Second, since the only
imperfect feature of the tax system under consideration at this point is rent mistaxation,
and since the point of the discussion is to eliminate this feature so as to assure no tax effect
on prices, consideration of tax effects on prices would not advance the analysis. See supra
notes 4-9 and accompanying discussion.
1992]
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is hidden in the rent structure must be taken into account to fully
reflect the economics of the transaction, as follows:
TABLE IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hidden Interest Year End
Economic Stated New on Loan Loan Balance Econ. Rent
Rent Rent Advance Balance (incl. int.) Plus Int.
6.14 5.59 0.56 0 0.56 6.14
5.84 5.59 0.25 0:06 0.86 5.89
5.53 5.59 -0.06 0.09 0.89 5.62
5.22 5.59 -0.37 0.09 0.61 5.32
4.92 5.59 -0.67 0.06 0 4.98
Table I provides the economic rent. The third column (hidden
new advance) is the money lent in the first four years of the lease
through understated rent - the positive difference between the
first two columns - to be repaid plus interest in the remaining
years out of overstated rent - the negative difference between the
first two columns. The fifth column shows the aggregate net loan
- advances plus interest less payments. Interest on this balance is
reflected in the fourth column. The total economic income in the
sixth column is the economic rent in the first column plus the hid-
den interest in the fourth column.
Current tax law takes a different view. It generally respects the
rent structure in a long-term lease. 4 Section 467,5 enacted in
1984,6 improved matters somewhat. It provides that if stated rent
24 Cf. Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 5, 1975-1 C.B. 715, 716-17 (The Service will grant an advance
ruling on validity of leveraged lease only if rent is essentially level). See Staff of Joint
Comm. on Tax'n, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 283-84 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Bluebook].
For simplicity, this Article assumes that all stated rent in a lease is fixed and paid cur-
rently. Thus, for example, rent holidays are not considered. Current law works relatively
well when the payment of stated rent is deferred. See I.R.C. § 467. Prepaid rent is discussed
infra Part IV.A.1. More generally, this Article assumes that all items are paid as they accrue
for federal income tax purposes, so that tax accounting methods are not relevant to the
discussion. Current law provides minor variations in the accounting for rent depending on
the taxpayer's accounting method, e.g., the cash method or the accrual method as modified
by the economic performance requirement of I.R.C. § 461(h). These differences are not ma-
terial for purposes of this Article. Contingent stated rent presents issues beyond the scope
of this Article.
22 I.R.C. § 467.
26 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 92(a), 98 Stat. 494, 609-12 (codified as
I.R.C. § 467).
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is to be paid after the period to which it relates, the lessor gener-
ally is treated as receiving the present value of the rent and relend-
ing that amount at the applicable discount rate to the lessee.2
Special rules level increasing rent structures in certain transactions
involving leasebacks and long-term leases.28 Section 467 did not go
far enough, however, as it still essentially presumes that level rent
is economic rent.
In short, under current law, the lessee in Table IV deducts the
level rent. The lessor is taxed on the level rent and deducts the
straight-line depreciation. Table V shows these calculations:
TABLE V
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lessor Lessor' Lessor Lessee Lessee Lessee
Econ. Inc Table IV Loan Econ. Ded Table IV Ded.
Table IV Cur. Law Treat. Table IV Cur. Law Loan Trt
3.07 2.52 3.07 6.14 5.59 6.14
2.82 2.52 2.82 5.89 5.59 5.89
2.54 2.52 2.54 5.62 5.59 5.62
2.24 2.52 2.24 5.32 5.59 5.32
1.90 2.52 1.90 4.98 5.59 4.98
12.58 12.58 12.58 27.94 27.94 27.94
For the lessor, economic income (the first column of Table V) is
determined by taking economic rent plus interest (the sixth col-
umn of Table IV) and subtracting economic depreciation, assumed
to be a level 3.07. Current-law taxable income (the second column
of Table V) is determined by subtracting depreciation, a level 3.07,
from the current-law rent, a level 5.59, to get level income of 2.52.
For the lessee, the economic deduction (the fourth column of Ta-
ble V) is the economic rent plus interest (the sixth column of Ta-
ble IV). The current-law deduction (the fifth column of Table V) is
the level rent of 5.59.
The total income to the lessor, or deduction to the lessee, over
the lease term is the same under an economic analysis (the first
and fourth columns of Table V) and current law (the second and
fifth columns of Table V), but is accounted for later under current
law, so that the present value of the tax to the lessor, and the pre-
I.R.C. § 467(a).
28 I.R.C. § 467(b).
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sent value of deductions to the lessee under current law is less than
would be the case under economic treatment.29 Moreover, the les-
sor is undertaxed by the exact amount that the lessee is overtaxed,
i.e., allowed inadequate deductions.
Current law, by not taxing rent in accordance with the underly-
ing economics, changes those economics. For example, current law,
as opposed to economic accounting, increases the after-tax yield to
a 34% tax bracket lessor on the machine in Table V approximately
0.5 percent. The relatively small effect is attributable to the rela-
tively slow depreciation of the machine - a machine with a faster
economic depreciation would experience greater mistaxation -
and the relatively short term of the lease.30 With a ten-year level-
rent lease of a property that depreciates economically over 15 years
under the 150 percent declining balance switching to straight line
when faster with no salvage value method in a 10% interest world,
current law increases the after-tax yield to a 34% bracket lessor by
nearly 8 percent. Longer leases of property with even faster depre-
ciation show even more dramatic effects of current law. Presuma-
bly some of those benefits are shared with the lessee through lower
rent, 1 but quantifying this additional complexity is beyond the
scope of this Article.
The instant analysis can seem counterfactual. After all, if a long-
term lease provides level rent, that is the rent, right? This cer-
tainly would be true if the lessee could terminate the lease at will
with no penalty. However, long-term leases customarily provide
29 Alvin C. Warren & Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction
of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1752, 1769 (1982). See also Miller,& Upton, supra
note 3, at 765. Miller and Upton explain the underlying economics as follows:
Any ... pattern of rentals over the next n periods which ha[s] the same present value
would be entirely equivalent, from the leasing company's point of view, to the se-
quence of optimal one-period rentals . . . It will be a property of the present value
computations, of course, that the leasing company's rate of return will be exactly the
same period by period as if it had engaged in a series of one-period rentals.
Id. Note that the rate of return (assumed to be fixed under the no risk assumption at the
point in their article from which the quotation is taken), and not the net investment, is
invariant with regard to the rent structure.
30 Of course, in a world with higher interest rates, the defects in current law also become
more dramatic.
" See Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at p. 783. The authors engage in a general equilib-
rium analysis and conclude that rents adjust for taxes perfectly. Id. A critique of their anal-
ysis is presented infra.
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substantial termination penalties.3 2 The parties might not con-
sciously view the penalty as protecting the premium rent in the
lease's later years. They might view the penalty as protecting the
lessor from market risks, or - less precisely, but more accurately
- as protecting the cash flow upon which the deal is priced. The
penalty provision might not be tailored to exactly compensate for
the loss of future premium rent. Nevertheless, the penalty usually
is enough to keep the lease in place, 3 in which case the instant
analysis of economic rent is valid. 4
In a given year, current law taxes income to the wrong taxpayer,
but it does tax the correct total amount of income. Nevertheless,
current law probably results in a net loss of revenue. If the lessee is
in a low tax bracket or otherwise would receive little benefit from
an economic rent deduction, the mistaxation under current law has
little effect on the lessee and undertaxes the lessor. By merely ad-
justing the stated rent, the lessor and lessee can defer the lessor's
income and accelerate the lessee's net income, reducing revenues.
More importantly, taxpayers will go out of their way to structure
lease transactions where the lessor is in a higher bracket than the
lessee and avoid transactions where the lessee is in a higher
bracket than the lessor."
There is no policy justification for this revenue loss. Moreover,
current law undesirably influences business decisions. Since rent
structures are designed with an eye on taxes, leasing becomes more
desirable than other means of securing the use of an asset for a
32 See Travis F. Epes, Equipment Leasing from the Lessee's Viewpoint, in Equipment
Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 843, 869 (Bruce E. Fritch, Albert F. Reisman & Ian Shrank
eds., 3d ed. 1988); Reisman & Mooney, supra note 20, at 80-93; Ian Shrank & Bruce E.
Fritch, Leveraged Leasing, in Equipment Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 99, 154-57, 162-65
(Bruce E. Fritch, Albert F. Reisman & Ian Shrank eds., 3d ed. 1988).
"3 A lease that provides above-market rent can be rejected b y a lessee in bankruptcy, but
damages (subject to limits, in the case of real property leases) are paid for the termination.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 502. A lessor generally is as well or better protected in bankruptcy
than a lender, on the apparent theory that a lessor owns the underlying property. For this
purpose, bankruptcy courts look to the general commercial law distinction between leases
and loans discussed infra note 55. See John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease
Distinction, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 667, 684-98 (1983); Reisman & Mooney, supra note 20, at 94-97.
" Lease terminations are discussed infra Part II.C.
"' See E. Durinck, K. Jansen, E. Laveren & C. Van Hulle, Leasing and the Pie Approach
to Capital Structure, 35 Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 387, 400-401 (1990);
Jeremy S.S. Edwards & Colin P. Mayer, Leasing, Taxes, and the Cost of Capital, 44 J. Pub.
Econ. 173, 193 (1991).
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low-bracket lessee because of the lower rent resulting from the les-
sor's tax benefits. This other means might be more advantageous
economically. Leasing becomes a more desirable type of invest-
ment activity for high-bracket lessors even if it is otherwise not
economically advantageous. Other contracts involving capital
transactions, such as options and swaps, are recognized as problem
areas, but ready solutions are not forthcoming. 3 As to leasing,
however, policymakers simply do not realize that there is a prob-
lem and that there is a fairly simple solution. Reform of the taxa-
tion of rent is needed.
This Article's economic analysis essentially assumes that the
user will either debt-finance or lease and concludes that problems
are presented when a low-bracket user leases from a high-bracket
lessor.3 7 Such focus is consistent with current, but not historical,
leasing practice. The early large-scale lease transactions were
viewed as providing excess lessee deductions and excess lessor in-
come compared to borrowing, so that most lessors were low-tax or
tax-exempt taxpayers.3" The basic analysis at the time compared
the interest deduction under owning to the much larger rent de-
duction under leasing.39 This analysis, however, is incomplete in
that depreciation must be factored in."° In any event, more gener-
ous depreciation became available in 1954. This shifted the focus
to transactions designed to provide tax benefits to lessors."' For
example, a chapter from a current leading text for leasing lawyers
puts it bluntly as follows:
3 See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 56 Fed. Reg. 31350 (Jul. 10, 1991) (awkward swap
regulations); infra notes 62, 63 (problems with options). See generally Patricia Brown, Tax
Consequences of Interest Rate Swaps: Characterization by Function, Not Prejudice, 6 Int'l
Tax & Bus. Law. 122, 133-67 (1988) (problems with swaps).
" See Homer Kripke, Book Review, 37 Bus. Law. 723, 724 (1982) (reviewing Equipment
Leasing - Leveraged Leasing (Bruce E. Fritch and Albert F. Reisman eds., 2d ed. 1980))
(noting that generally it is more appropriate to compare a lease with an installment
purchase than with a cash purchase).
38 See William L. Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Prop-
erty: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17-21, 28 (1948); Kripke,
supra note 37, at 724.
31 See Cary, supra note 38, at 17, 28.
" See Cary, supra note 38, at 17-18.
" See Kripke, supra note 37, at 724; Shrank & Fritch, supra note 32, at 102-106. Also, as
discussed infra note 60, the law might have dealt satisfactorily with lessee-favoring leasing,
so that only lessor-favoring leasing could be done. The significance of non-economic acceler-
ated depreciation is considered in Part III.
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[A] lease transaction is a vehicle for making tax attributes of prop-
erty ownership available to the lessor and passing a portion of the
economic benefit of such attributes back to the lessee.4 2
Interestingly, much of the finance literature takes a different
tack, resulting in a much more sanguine view of leasing. This liter-
ature customarily starts by comparing a lease with an acquisition
financed with debt and equity in a fixed ratio,43 and concludes that
leases are not the relatively tax-preferred form of financing. This is
because an equity-financed acquisition is even more tax-preferred
than leasing. Consider a tax-exempt organization: If it buys a ma-
chine using its own funds (equity financing), none of the return on
the capital invested in the machine (economic interest) is taxed. If
the organization leases the machine from a taxable entity, the re-
turn on capital in the rent is taxed to the lessor, although the re-
turn is relatively undertaxed because of the mistaxation of rent.44
Only if the aggregate effect of the mistaxation of rent were a nega-
tive tax rate, which is impossible,45 would leasing be more desirable
than owning. Matters get more complicated once one takes into
account (a) low-tax and tax-exempt users, and (b) that the financ-
ing of a purchased machine is a mixture of equity and debt in a
fixed ratio. Nevertheless, in most cases the tax advantages to the
equity-financed portion of a purchased machine will exceed the tax
advantages of leasing. Thus, the mistaxation of rent should not
drive low-tax or no-tax users into leasing. This point of view might
explain the relatively small notice taken of the problems in current
"' See William A. Macan IV & Richard L. Umbrecht, Tax Aspects of Equipment Leasing,
in Equipment Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 313, 455 (Bruce E. Fritch, Albert F. Reisman &
Ian Shrank eds., 3d ed. 1988). Of course, at this point in this Article, it is assumed that
taxes have not affected prices, so that there has been no pass-back of benefits to the lessee
as suggested in the quotation in the text.
" See, e.g., Wilbur G. Lewellen, Michael S. Long & John J. McConnell, Asset Leasing in
Competitive Capital Markets, 31 J. Fin. 787, 787-97 (1976); Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at
781-83. This is not always the case, however. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey & C. M. Young,
Debt, Taxes and Leasing - A Note, 35 J. Fin. 1245, 1249 (1980) ("If an issue of equity is
not a feasible option, leasing is likely to be the preferred method of financing for a tax-
exempt charity.").
" See Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at 781-83.
" Non-economic accelerated depreciation plus rent mistaxation can result - and has re-
sulted - in negative tax rates. See Alan J. Auerbach, Welfare Aspects of Current U.S. Cor-
porate Taxation, 73 Amer. Econ. Rev. - Papers and Proceedings 76, 77-78 (1983). Non-
economic depreciation is considered in Part III of this Article.
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law."6.
This conclusion seems wrong, however. After all, tax-driven leas-
ing does occur. Comparing leasing to buying using a fixed ratio of
debt to equity seems to hide the real tax effect due to the different
overall debt-to-equity ratios for the user in the lease and purchase
transactions. It is possible to develop an intuitive explanation here.
Portfolio theory suggests that one look to how taxpayers adjust
their holdings in response to tax changes. Here, one quickly fo-
cuses on how low-bracket users respond to the tax benefits of leas-
ing. While a tax-exempt does quite well if it 100% equity-finances
a machine, so that the economic return on an amount equal to the
equity tied up in the building is tax-exempt, as noted in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the tax-exempt does even better if it changes its
holdings: equity-financing interest-bearing obligations and leasing
the machine. By doing so, the tax-exempt gets two tax benefits.
First, its equity takes full advantage of the tax exemption. Second,
the tax advantages of the lease should enable the tax-exempt to
obtain the use of the machine for a low rent resulting from the
mistaxation of rent."7 Portfolio adjustments that hold the user's
overall debt-to-equity ratio constant give the tax-exempt a double
tax benefit if it leases rather than owns. Thus, current leasing tax
law encourages low-bracket taxpayers to lease, making the tax
problems with leasing transactions a considerable concern.
3. Reform
There are two helpful ways to think about these defects in cur-
rent law. First, one can focus on rent, as has been done thus far in
this Article, and view the problem as arising from taxing rent in-
consistently with depreciation. Second, one can reverse the focus:
examining depreciation so as to attribute the problem to current
law improperly accounting for the return of capital in long-term
leases. Depreciation under current law does not provide for a re-
turn of capital that is consistent with the economics of a long-term
lease with level rent.4 8 The second way of thinking about current
6 Further explanations are considered infra notes 48, 72.
See Harvey Galper & Eric Toder, Owning or Leasing: Bennington College and the U.S.
Tax System, 36 Nat'l Tax. J. 257, 258-60 (1983). This Article owes a considerable debt to
Galper and Toder.
48 Marvin A. Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 143-45; Stewart C. Myers, David A. Dill &
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law motivates a simple reform.
The theoretically correct way to tax any lease is to determine the
economic rent,"' tax it, calculate any hidden economic lending, and
tax it. This seems unacceptably complicated. Thinking about cur-
rent law as providing a defective return of capital suggests that one
compare the return of capital in a lease with that in a loan. After
all, a loan is simply a special type of lease: one where the property
being "leased" is money. The only fundamental difference between
a loan and a lease, when present, is the nature of the final property
payment - i.e., cash, or other property and cash.
Treating a lease as if it were a loan is only a little tricky. In the
example in Table IV, the lessee is using a machine with a ten-year
life for five years. Thus, an analogous loan would be for the entire
value of the machine (30.72). The payments (principal plus inter-
est) on this loan would be the 5.59 cash rent payments plus the
value of the machine when it is returned after five years. This
value of the machine at the end of a lease is referred to customa-
rily as the "residual value." Under the assumed economic deprecia-
tion, the machine is worth 15.36 after five years, as shown in Table
I. Thus, the total payments on the loan in the last year are 20.95
(5.59 cash rent plus 15.36 residual value of the machine). The im-
plicit loan resembles a loan with a balloon payment. This residual
value loan analysis is customarily used in pricing lease transac-
tions,5" and is required when a lessor accounts for a lease as a loan
for financial accounting purposes.51 The loan based on these as-
sumptions looks as follows:
Alberto J. Bautista, Valuation of Financial Lease Contracts, 31 J. Fin. 799, 813-14 (1976)
("[When] depreciation is accelerated relative to the principal repayments implicit in the
lease, the government suffers a net loss in terms of present value."). This viewpoint might
help explain why people view the problem as a depreciation problem, and not a rent mistax-
ation problem.
"" Economic rent could be reverse engineered from economic depreciation, as in Table I.
' See generally Ahlstrom & Engelson, supra note 23, at 562-64; G. Timothy Haight &
Kenneth J. Smith, Equipment Leasing: Residual Values and Investor Returns, 45 Tax Notes
1233 (Dec. 4, 1989).
" Accounting for Leases, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, 99 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Board 1976) [hereinafter FASB 131.
1992]
702 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 11:683
TABLE VI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Balance Interest Payments
1 30.72 3.07 5.59
2 28.21 2.82 5.59
3 25.44 2.54 5.59
4 22.39 2.24 5.59
5 19.05 1.91 20.95
The payments in the fourth column are as assumed. Applying
the assumed 10% interest rate to the balance of the loan in the
second column gives the interest in the third column. The loan bal-
ance is assumed to start at 30.72. It then is increased by interest
(column three) and decreased by payments (column four).
As can be seen in Table VI, the lessor's economic income on this
loan is the same as in Table V. Loan treatment gives the correct
economic answer and is simpler than determining the correct eco-
nomic rent under lease treatment. This is not a surprising result -
economic income does not come in flavors. The income inherent in
a transaction does not depend on whether the transaction is
viewed as a lease (the lessee using the lessor's machine) or a loan
(the lessee using the lessor's money). In both cases, the lessor earns
an economic return on its net investment. The lessee's total cost
equals the lessor's return plus the economic decline in value of the
property; under loan treatment, this is depreciation plus interest,
and, under lease treatment, this is rent - which equals deprecia-
tion plus interest. In other words, since, under the instant assump-
tions, the lessor and lessee are indifferent between lending and
leasing, the tax system also should be. A difference in the property
used to make the last payment in the contract should not make a
fundamental difference in the tax treatment of that contract.2
In light of this analysis, rather than legislate the taxation of eco-
nomic rent, an equivalent reform under the instant artificial as-
2 Kripke makes this basic point persuasively:
Chattel security law, accounting, and tax law have been most inept in letting the tail
wag the dog, i.e., letting the question of treatment of the bulk of the property rights
and a major portion of a total purchase price depend on . . . [the] residual. The fact
is that the residual at the end of an eight, ten, or fifteen-year lease of equipment has
so little present value at the inception of the lease . . . that it can make no sense for
any determinations for legal, accounting, or tax purposes to turn on [the residual].
Kripke, supra note 37, at 728.
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sumptions would be to tax the Table IV lessor like a lender. This
treatment is shown in the third column of Table V. At the end of
Year 5, the lessor would own the machine with a basis equal to the
residual value of 15.36 (having "depreciated" 15.36 of the 30.72
cost as principal recovery against cash on the loan proxy). Loan
treatment, in effect, takes the rent structure at face value but con-
forms depreciation to -it in order to avoid the inconsistent treat-
ment currently provided.
A similar result applies to the lessee. If the transaction were
viewed as a lending, the lessee would be treated as borrowing 30.72
and buying the machine for 30.72. The lessee would deduct the
amounts in the fourth column of Table VI as interest and also
would deduct depreciation (straight-line, with the Table IV ma-
chine). This is the sixth column of Table V. Again, loan treatment
is identical to economic treatment.
This reform deals with the mistaxation of rent without needing a
determination of economic rent, a calculation of a hidden loan, or
any of the other complex features of Table IV.5 3 Taxpayers are fa-
miliar with the underlying calculations, as the reform uses the
time-value and related concepts that current law applies in the
loan context. 4 This reform has an additional benefit. The distinc-
tion between leases and loans has plagued the tax law for some
time, and still results in considerable litigation between taxpayers
and the Service." This Article's proposal makes the distinction
'. Indirect lease acquisition costs, such as legal fees, incurred by the lessor would be
treated as an increase in the amount loaned for purposes of the lessor's calculations, reduc-
ing its income, but not the lessee's deduction, over the lease term. The lessee's costs would
be treated as prepaid rent for purposes of its calculations, but not the lessor's, increasing the
lessee's deductions over the lease term. This treats the expenditures identically regardless of
whether they are paid by the lessee directly, or by the lessor and reimbursed through higher
rent. Current law provides straight-line amortization to the payor with no effect on the
other party to the lease. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(a) (lessee deduction); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-
3 (lessor deduction).
" I.R.C. §§ 1271-75. See also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time
Value of Money," 95 Yale L. J. 506, 508-15, 535-38, 551-52 (1986).
" There is a large and confused body of law that distinguishes true leases from loans for
federal income tax purposes, summarized in B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts 4.4.2, 4.4.3 (2d ed. 1989). Basically, the law looks at a given
transaction to see whether it more closely resembles a paradigmatic lease or a paradigmatic
loan. A purported lease transaction is examined to see whether it contains loan-like features,
such as a particularly small residual (so that the lessor has little current interest in the
property), lessee investment, lessee benefits from residual appreciation (e.g., from a lessee
purchase or lease renewal option), lessee risk of loss with regard to the residual (e.g., from a
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rather unimportant, which is quite attractive.
lessor put option), and the like. Id. These features have little bearing on the real tax issues:
mistaxation of rent and non-economic accelerated depreciation (discussed in Part III). See
supra note 52. Thus, not surprisingly, the lease/loan distinction under current law misses
the point and achieves unsatisfactory and arbitrary results. See, e.g., Saul D. Kronovet,
Characterization of Real Estate Leases: An Analysis and Proposal, 32 Tax Law. 757, 763
(1979); Note, "Safe Harbor" as Tax Reform: Taxpayer Election of Lease Treatment, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 1648, 1666-68 (1982).
Financial accounting has its own rules for distinguishing leases from loans. See FASB 13,
supra note 51. Basically, a lease of personal property will be respected unless it contains any
of the following provisions:
1. The lease transfers ownership at the end of the lease term.
2. The lessee has a bargain purchase option.
3. The lease extends over 75% or more of the leased property's estimated economic
life.
4. The present value of the lease payments is 90% or more of the value of the leased
property.
Id. at 7. The principal concern underlying FASB 13 is whether to show the leased asset
and the liability inherent in a long-term lease on the lessee's balance sheet. Id. at 60. Loan
treatment is appropriate when the risks of the property have been transferred to the lessee.
Id. Thus, the FASB 13 standards are of little relevance to the instant income measurement
issues. There is evidence that the FASB's lease/loan distinction interferes with economic
decisions. James Ang & Pamela P. Peterson, The Leasing Puzzle, 39 J. Fin. 1055, 1063-64
(1984). Somewhat different rules apply to real estate transactions. See FASB 13, supra, at 1
24-28; Accounting for Leases: * Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate * Sales-
Type Leases of Real Estate * Definition of Lease Term * Indirect Costs of Direct Financing
Leases, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 98, 7-13 (Fin. Accounting Stan-
dards Board 1988) [hereinafter FASB 98]. Special financial accounting rules limit the use of
sale-leasebacks to trigger realization of gain, as discussed infra note 182.
Commercial law also distinguishes between leases and loans. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 2A-
103(1)(j) (1987). Basically, a lease is treated as a loan if the rent obligation extends over the
term of the lease and any one of the following applies:
1. The lease term extends over the economic life of the property.
2. The lessee is required to re-lease the property for the rest of its life or to buy the
property.
3. The lessee has an option to renew the lease for nominal consideration.
4. The lessee has an option to buy the property for nominal consideration.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37). The lease/loan distinction is relevant for two U.C.C. purposes: First, in
order for a lessor/secured lender to be fully protected, it must record a loan but not a lease.
UCC §§ 2A-307, 9-301, 9-302. Second, a lessor's rights and obligations with regard to goods
are different than a seller's, although lessees and buyers are treated similarly. The principal
differences are in remedies, warranties, and disclaimers. See Edwin E. Huddleson, Old Wine
in New Bottles: U.C.C. Article 2A - Leases, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 615, 641-68 (1988). Bankruptcy
law draws upon the commercial law lease/loan distinction and provides different results in a
variety of contexts depending upon whether a transaction is characterized as a lease or a
loan. See Ayer, supra note 33, at 690-98. As discussed supra note 33, a lessor generally is
treated as well or better than a lender. The issues in the commercial law and bankruptcy
contexts are so remote from the instant concerns, however, that this law is not considered
further. For wonderful critiques of the commercial law and bankruptcy lease/loan distinc-
tions, see Ayer, supra note 33; Kripke, supra note 37, at 726-30. (Ayer traces his critique as
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The proposed reform uses a simple loan calculation, but does re-
quire two facts that might not be readily available: the fair market
value of the machine at the beginning of the lease and the ex-
pected residual value at lease termination. As to the value at the
outset, in many cases this should not present a problem, since
many leases commence shortly after the lessor acquires the leased
property. Used leased property is discussed in Part II. As to the
value of the residual, if economic depreciation were provided by
law, the expected residual value could be determined by applying
the depreciation schedule for the period of the lease to the value of
the leased property at lease commencement. 5 Problems presented
by statutory non-economic accelerated depreciation are dealt with
in Part III.
The proposal makes the taxation of rent dependent on the de-
preciation of the underlying property. A lease can cover more than
one kind of property, such as one lease that covers both a deprecia-
ble building and non-depreciable land. An allocation of rent be-
tween the various kinds of leased property is required in order to
apply the proposal to the various leased properties. This allocation
is not required currently and therefore makes the proposal some-
what more complicated than current law in this regard. The tax
law frequently requires taxpayers to break a unified business
transaction into its component tax pieces, however. For example,
when a taxpayer acquires a business by buying the business' assets
for a lump sum, this is treated as a separate purchase of each asset
in the business, so that the purchase price must be allocated over
all of the assets. 7 Thus, the allocation required under the proposal
is in line with this aspect of current law. Also, the allocation under
the proposal should be required infrequently and primarily in large
transactions where the costs of making the allocation (e.g., apprais-
ers) are not unduly burdensome. This would not undermine the
advantages of the proposal.
Another interesting question is whether the interest component
far back as Maitland! Ayer, supra note 33, at 667 n.3.)
"6 The value of the residual in property best suited for use only by the lessor might be
particularly difficult to determine. Current law, in determining depreciation of tangible
property, does not worry about how property is going to be used. I.R.C. § 168. Thus, the
problem that this special use property presents to the instant proposal is not developed
further here.
" See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
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of the rent proxy should be treated as interest (paid, incurred, or
earned) for other tax purposes, such as the rules for capitalization
of construction period interest58 and the special foreign tax credit
limitation applicable to interest.5 9 The basic analysis above sug-
gests that it should. This would further serve to reduce the signifi-
cance of the lease/loan distinction, which is desirable. The specific
policies underlying each of the other special rules for interest
should be examined to verify that this treatment is appropriate,
however, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
This suggested reform could be limited to long-term leases, as
the size of the potential hidden loan - and, therefore, the amount
of potential mistaxation - is necessarily smaller with loans that
extend over a shorter period of years, measured without regard to
the life of the underlying property. Also, this reform need not ap-
ply to leases of undeveloped land, as the mistaxation analysis
above does not apply to nondepreciating property, such as land.
4. Accelerated or Excessive Stated Rent
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the most common lease
transactions: where the stated rent has the same present value as
economic rent, but the stated rent is less rapid than economic rent.
It also is possible to structure transactions that involve accelerated
or excessive rent. These transactions are not very common; in fact,
current law discourages them. 0 Nevertheless, it is helpful to note
that the instant proposal could easily eliminate any benefit from
such transactions.
The classic example of an excessive rent transaction involves
above-market rent coupled with an option for the lessee to
purchase the property at the end of the lease for a below-market
price,6" or to renew for below-market rent. In this case, the stated
rent actually contains hidden payments for an option.2 As option
I.R.C. § 263A(f).
I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(B).
60 Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, basically outlaws excessive rent transactions by re-
quiring that the stated rent be reasonable. Stated prepaid rent (as compared to accelerated
stated rent) is discussed infra Part IV.A.1.
61 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-540, § 2.02(d), 1955-2 C.B. 39, 40 (basically outlaws excessive
rent transactions by requiring that the stated rent be reasonable).
62 Since, at this point, the text assumes no risk, the option payments must reflect a be-
low-market option price. A lessee option to buy for a fixed price or re-lease at a set rent
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payments, the amounts would be deductible later; as rent, the hid-
den option payments are deductible currently. 3 If all leases were
treated as loans, the lessee would only be allowed to deduct eco-
nomic rent, while being taxed on hidden interest, thus eliminating
this abuse.
This can be seen in the context of the ongoing example. Assume
that the machine is rented for 14 per year for two years, at which
time the lessee can purchase the property for 7.77 (the expected
residual'value of 24.58, reduced by the excess rent plus interest). If
the proposal were applied, the yield on the loan proxy would be in
excess of 37%." This is obviously absurd. The proposal deals auto-
matically with accelerated, but not overstated, stated rent. Thus,
to deal with excessive rent transactions, the proposal could provide
that if the implicit interest rate in a lease with a lessee purchase or
renewal option exceeds some ceiling on yields, the option is treated
as exercised. 5 A 10% ceiling would work here as follows:
serves to reduce risk by assuring the continuing future availability of the leased property at
a known cost. An interesting question is the economic accounting for the portion of the
price of an option attributable to this risk reduction. In a sense, the risk reduction relates to
the future, but has a current impact on the value of the business. Thus, only the cost of
reduction of risk (value fluctuations) during the current year should be deductible currently.
A tax problem is presented when rent contains a hidden premium for an option that relates
to future risks. This problem is part of the general hardship of accounting for risk reduction
devices, such as options, that relate to risk over multiple years. Since an analysis of the
general problem is beyond the scope of this Article, the problem of misaccounting for risk
reduction premiums hidden in rent is not considered further. Any resulting errors are prob-
ably small.
613 If the option is not exercised, its cost is allowed as a loss at that time. If the option is
exercised, its cost is treated as a cost of the underlying property, probably recovered as the
property is depreciated. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. It should be noted that these
rules make the treatment of options that merely reallocate risk inconsistent with the treat-
ment of other forms of risk allocation, such as insurance. If the hidden option payments in
rent are viewed as insurance payments, their current treatment is objectionable only to the
extent they do more than pay for the reallocation of risk, i.e., when the option price is below
the expected market price of the property on the option exercise date, as in the types of
transaction under consideration in the text. Alternatively, if one views option exercise as a
sure thing, the excess rent is really prepaid purchase price or prepaid rent. This does not
change the basic tax analysis, however. Current rent still is overstated.
64 The loan would provide a Year I payment of 14 (rent) and a total Year 2 payment of
38.58 (14 rent + 24.58 residual).
6" Current law requires some minimum interest in most deferred payment transactions.
I.R.C. § 1274.
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TABLE VII
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balance Interest Payments Depreciation Total Ded.
30.72 3.07 14.00 3.07 6.14
19.80 1.98 21.77 3.07 5.05
In Year 1, this loan treatment provides the lessee the deduction
in the fifth column (interest plus depreciation), which equals eco-
nomic rent. The lessor is taxed on the interest in the second col-
umn. In Year 2, the lessee has paid the lessor 14, consisting of eco-
nomic rent of 6.14 and a loan of 7.86. Thus, in Year 2, while the
lessee deducts economic rent (5.84), it must also be taxed on inter-
est on the 7.86 loan (0.79), leaving the net effect of 5.05 seen in the
fifth column. The lessor is taxed on the interest in the second col-
umn. At the end of Year 2, the lessee will have deducted only 11.19
of its 28 of stated rent. The remaining 16.81 is a loan. The loan is
treated as exchanged along with 7.77 of cash for the leased prop-
erty."" Thus, the property is treated as sold for 24.58 (16.81 +
7.77), which is the expected market value at the end of Year 2. The
lessee gets a basis of 24.58. Again, loan treatment has the effect of
taxing economic rent and any hidden lending - although, here,
the loan is from the lessee to the lessor; while, above, the loan was
from the lessor to the lessee.
Note how elegantly the proposal applies here. 7 The proposal, in
effect, separates the use of the property (economic depreciation)
from the financing of that use (payments for the use), and taxes
each in accordance with their economics, so as to eliminate the
abuse potential of manipulated payment streams. Use is accounted
for with assumed economic depreciation, which is the same depre-
ciation allowed any owner of depreciable property, and, thus, is
readily available. The financing is accounted for using the lessee's
actual payments and economic depreciation, so that the interest
component of rent is determined with respect to the lessor's real
" If an option to renew the lease, rather than an option to buy, were involved, the 16.81
would be accounted for as a reduction of the implicit loan in the lease over the renewal
period.
7 While the general problem of accelerated or excessive rent does not seem particularly
significant at this time, a lessee purchase or lease renewal option, perhaps at a bargain price,
is common; having a simple mechanism to deal with these options can be quite useful. See
Shrank & Fritch, supra note 32, at 169-71.
[Vol. 11:683
Taxation of Business Rent
net investment. Abuse is eliminated merely by putting a ceiling on
yields, without any need to value rent, to value option prices, or to
determine the "real" lease period.68 Rules that mirror these rules
could apply to leases where the lessor has a sale or renewal option.
The proposal deals only with situations where the total pay-
ments (rent plus residual, or rent plus an option price) have a pre-
sent value equal to the value of the leased property. 9 Rent could
be increased as hidden compensation to the lessor for property or
services provided to the lessee not involving the use of the leased
property. Similarly, rent could be decreased as hidden compensa-
tion to the lessee for property or services provided to the lessor not
involving the use of the leased property. If this is done in either
case, the proposal's loan calculations will not work properly. The
other transaction reflected in the lease payments must be identi-
fied and priced. Then, the lease payments can be appropriately ad-
justed to eliminate any effect of the other transaction. Only after
this adjustment will the present value of the lease payments equal
the amount of the loan proxy, and the proposal work properly.
Under current law, it is necessary to identify and separately ac-
count for such rent adjustments whenever they relate to nonde-
ductible or capitalized payments.70 Thus, the separate accounting
needed for the proposal is not substantially more burdensome than
the separate accounting required currently.
5. Service and Non-Net Leases
The question arises as to the treatment of a lessor under a non-
net lease that requires the lessor to maintain the property, to pay
property taxes and insurance, to provide services, or the like. Rules
to deal with such a lease materially complicate the proposal.
First, consider a lease that requires the lessor to repair and
maintain the leased property. Under this lease, the lessor pays the
expenses of repair and maintenance. The tax results of a lease
" But cf. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
", At this point, the stated rent does not pay for services associated with the use of the
property. The situation where the stated rent pays for services is discussed infra Part I.B.5.
7" As to the lessor, it does not seem likely that there are any benefits from converting
some other form of lessor income into immediately taxable rent. As to the lessee, when the
adjustments relate to something currently deductible, a separate accounting would have no
net effect, as the increased rent deduction would be offset by losing an equal non-rent
deduction.
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should not depend upon whether, as above, the lessee pays such
expenses and deducts them or, as is the case here, the lessor pays
the expenses, deducting them, and receives offsetting amounts as
"rent."7' Under the proposal, this would be achieved by, when a
lease requires the lessor to repair and maintain the property, (i)
backing the expected repair and maintenance expenses out of the
stated rent for each year, (ii) determining the proxy rent based on
this adjusted stated rent, and, then, (iii) increasing this rent proxy
each year by the expected expenses for that year. This methodol-
ogy gives the lessee the same deductions as if it paid the expected
expenses itself, and gives the lessor the correct amounts of income
to offset those deductions. Failure to account separately for repairs
and maintenance generally would result in the portion of the
stated rent attributable to them being taxed- in an accelerated
fashion, which would overtax the lessor and undertax the lessee if
the repairs and maintenance are level or increasing with time -
which seems likely.7 2 Unfortunately, the correct calculation re-
quires an expected amount, determined at the beginning of the
lease, of all such expenses for each year of the lease. An updated
version of the Treasury's annual asset guideline repair allowance
percentages would provide an acceptable estimate.73
The same basic analysis applies to a lease that requires the les-
sor to pay property taxes and insurance or to bear the risk of theft
or destruction, i.e., self-insure. Both are fairly common situations;
" See supra note 3. Only expected expenses are priced into a non-net lease, however, so
that the proposal need only account for expected expenses. Of course, when the lessor's or
the lessee's actual current expenses vary from those priced into the lease, this should be
reflected currently.
7 The lessor's overtaxation on service payments partially offsets the undertaxation of
economic rent. This means that service leases are not as mistaxed as net leases, which is an
additional possible explanation of why current law's mistaxation of rent has received rela-
tively little attention.
"' These are set out in Rev. Proc. 83-35, 1983-1 C.B. 745, obsoleted by Rev. Proc. 87-56,
1987-2 C.B. 674. Of course, it is the parties' expected expenses that are priced into the rent,
not a third person's estimate or the actual expenses. Since these expected expenses are not
determinable as a practical matter, an objective estimate is the best that can be done.
The Treasury repair allowances key off the now-repealed asset depreciation range system
and no longer apply. Rev. Proc. 87-56, § 2.03, 1987-2 C.B. 674, 675. Consequently, using the
Treasury repair allowances in the proposal would require the Treasury to update them. Pre-
sumably, they still monitor repairs in their supervision of depreciation under I.R.C. §
167(i)(1), since, as discussed supra note 9, repair patterns affect depreciable lives. Thus, any
required update should not be particularly burdensome. The repair allowances are a fixed
percentage of the nondepreciated basis of the property. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-ll(d)(2)(iii).
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either requires an adjustment to the proposal. Insurance might be
purchased under a long-term contract, so that a good estimate is
available, otherwise, any estimate here seems problematic. The
best that can be done might be to use a level annual estimate equal
to the first year's expenses. Since insurance and taxes probably are
expected to increase, such an estimate likely results in overstated
accelerated rent. Some ad hoc increase, e.g., 5% per year, could be
used for purposes of the estimate. In short, accounting for property
taxes and insurance is a very real problem with the instant propo-
sal. While this problem seems small compared to the problems
with current law, further study clearly is indicated.
Finally, consider a. lease that requires the lessor to provide ser-
vices, such as training operators of the leased property. As with
repairs and maintenance, under the proposal, any compensation
for services must be split out of the rent and accounted for sepa-
rately. It seems reasonable to simply require taxpayers to sepa-
rately account for services provided under a lease of property. 4 As
noted above,75 such 'allocations are common in the tax law. Further
requiring a taxpayer who buys services and the use of property for
a lump sum, as is the situation here, to break down the lump sum
does not seem particularly burdensome or unreasonable.
C. Rent, Risk, and Change
The economic analysis gets more complicated once one takes
risk and change into account.7 6 A detailed analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article. General principles suggest, however, that the
two key conclusions reached above continue to be true.
First, under any realistic assumptions about risks and expecta-
tions, the basic analysis that current law mistaxes rent is valid.
Since economic depreciation is straight-line or faster, and eco-
nomic interest must be greater in the early years of an asset's life
because the investment is greater then, accelerated rent must be
the norm. Since current tax law respects level rent, while still pro-
viding level or more accelerated depreciation, current law conse-
" This is required with regard to services not related to the property, as discussed supra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
" The discussion of insurance, theft, and destruction in the preceding section of this Arti-
cle dealt somewhat with risk.
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quently undertaxes lessors and overtaxes lessees. 77 This creates un-
justified tax planning opportunities.7 8 Considerable revenue is lost.
Economic behavior is distorted.
Second, loan treatment of long-term leases is likely to provide
considerably more accurate accounting than current law. Once one
allows that the residual in a lease involves different risks than cash
payments under the lease, it becomes virtually impossible to find a
loan that is a perfect proxy for a lease. This is not all that troub-
ling, however. For example, the various payments (principal and
interest) in a loan might involve different risks, yet current law, in
effect, ignores this in its constant interest rate approach. Thus,
while further analysis is needed, it seems that loan treatment,
while not perfect, should .provide better accounting than current
law.
II. USED LEASED PROPERTY AND REALIZATION
Two problems are presented if leased property is not new at the
commencement of the lease. First, as noted above, one must deter-
mine how to apply the proposal. Second, rules are needed to deal
with any unrealized gain or loss in the leased property at the time
the lease commences.
A. Realization Basics
Current law generally does not tax fluctuations in the value of
property until the gain or loss is realized in a transaction. 79 The
For example, Miller and Upton generalize their basic analysis (which, except for the
limitations discussed supra Part I.B.2. supports the instant conclusions) for all risks. Miller
& Upton, supra note 3, at 774.
" Once one relaxes the assumption that the tax law has no effect on prices, the market
might reprice assets so as to redistribute the tax benefits of leasing. This repricing and
related economic activity is an unjustifiable tax-induced distortion of economic behavior.
Consequently, even allowing for tax shifting, mistaxation under current law is objectionable.
" See generally David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U, Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986) (arguing, inter alia, that accrual taxation would be
more efficient, more equitable, and simpler than the current system). For the sake of sim-
plicity, the present discussion merges recognition notions into the idea of realization.
The realization concept originally was developed in financial accounting, but became so-
lidified by early developments under the income tax. See James D. Cox, Financial Informa-
tion, Accounting, and the Law: Cases and Materials 201-67 (1980); Ted J. Fiflis, Homer
Kripke & Paul M. Foster, Accounting for Business Lawyers - Teaching Materials 154-230
(3d ed. 1984).
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purposes underlying this rule of convenience are not well-defined.
Perhaps the most widely-held view is that this requirement serves
to avoid valuing property when there is no "realization" transac-
tion, such as a sale, that provides evidence of the value. Such valu-
ations would be burdensome and speculative."0
Realization is not an economic notion. In fact, the realization re-
gime causes the tax system to have untoward economic effects.8 '
Most obviously, a tax burden on realizations generally discourages
realizations. Although realization only goes to when income is to be
taxed, not realizing gain sooner generally decreases the present
value of the tax deduction, and, therefore, generally discourages
sellers from engaging in realization transactions. Similarly, a tax
benefit from realizations generally encourages realizations; realiz-
ing loss sooner increases the present value of the deduction and
thus encourages realization transactions.2
Under these circumstances, the best that can be done in design-
ing a realization regime is to choose rules that have the least troub-
ling impact on behavior.8 3 This is important, as bad realization
rules could have a substantial effect. For example, if sales always
triggered an immediate tax on gain84 and leases did not, highly-
taxed potential sellers would be encouraged to lease rather than to
sell, which would be very troubling. 5 Good realization rules avoid
this kind of problem by treating similar transactions similarly. Un-
fortunately, there is no mechanical economic measure of similarity.
A potential realization transaction frequently is similar both to a
transaction that is treated as a realization event and to one that is
not. In this case, judgment must be exercised in deciding which
treatment, realization or non-realization, will have the least troub-
" Mundstock, supra note 5, at 1220-28.
" See Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Reform, 42 Nat'l Tax. J. 391
(1989).
" Deferring realization defers the tax, which, as long as the tax in the later year is not
materially higher than the tax in earlier years, reduces the tax in present value terms.
" Of course, revenues have an impact on the decision. It generally is better, however, to
choose revenue-raisers that have less impact on behavior over those that have a more signif-
icant impact. Thus, this Article looks solely to achieve neutrality, leaving the quest for reve-
nues to provisions that have a lesser impact on behavior.
" Current Code provisions on installment reporting prevent this from happening. See
I.R.C. § 453.
" There are various scenarios where accelerating gain or deferring loss reduces the total
tax of buyer and seller. This additional complexity would not change the instant conclusions
and is not discussed further.
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ling effect on behavior.
B. Leasing and Realization
Current law provides partial deferred realization in lease trans-
actions. When a lessor leases used property with an adjusted tax
basis (basically, the historic cost less accumulated depreciation)
that differs from the property's fair market value, tax depreciation
is determined using the adjusted tax basis, not the fair market
value. Thus, if the property has a built-in unrealized gain so that
the fair market value is greater than the tax basis, tax depreciation
is smaller than economic depreciation.8 6 This has the effect of tax-
ing a portion of the unrealized gain over the lease term through the
understated depreciation. Similarly, when leased property has an
unrealized loss at lease commencement, the built-in loss is par-
tially realized over time through overstated depreciation, as com-
pared to economic depreciation. The lessee is unaffected by the
lessor's accounting for unrealized gain or loss.
This can be illustrated in the context of the ongoing example.
Assume that the machine in Table V, while worth 30.72 at lease
commencement, only has an adjusted basis of 20.72 at such time,
i.e., that the machine has a built-in, unrealized, gain of 10, but still
has ten years of life remaining over which the machine will depre-
ciate on a straight-line basis with no salvage value. Under current
law, each year the lessor has net income of 3.52 (5.59 rent less 2.07
depreciation), rather than the 2.52 in Table V. The additional 1.00
of annual net income spreads the unrealized gain pro rata over the
ten remaining years in the life of the property. With the five-year
lease, a total gain of 5 is taxed pro rata over 5 years. Note that half
of the total gain, 5, is taxed, because the depreciation schedules
allow 50% depreciation over the lease. The portion of the total
gain taxed is a function of these schedules with no adjustment for
present values and therefore usually is less than the portion of the
total value of the property represented by the leasehold. In the
example, the leasehold is worth 21.18 (the present value of the eco-
nomic rent), while the property is worth 30.72, so that the lease-
hold represents 68.9% of the total value, yet only 50% of the gain
"' I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 1012, 1016(a)(2). At this point, the text still assumes that the tax
code's depreciation schedules represent an economic rate if applied to current values. Part
III, infra, looks at non-economic accelerated depreciation.
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is taxed.
The proposal can be applied to the lessor similarly to current
law.8 7 All calculations would assume that the property is worth its
adjusted tax basis at lease commencement. In the example, the
loan proxy would be of 20.72 with payments (principal and inter-
est) of 5.59 for the first four years and 15.95 in the fifth year (5.59
stated rent plus an expected residual of 10.36 determined by ap-
plying five years of ten-year straight-line depreciation to the
20.72). This loan provides an annual yield of 20.29%.88 The higher
yield is required to tax a portion of the unrealized gain. Table VIII
looks as follows:
TABLE VIII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Balance Interest Payments
1 20.72 4.20 5.59
2 19.34 3.92 5.59
3 17.67 3.59 5.59
4 15.67 3.18 5.59
5 13.26 2.69 15.95
17.58
At the end of the lease, the lessor would have a basis of 10.36. This
is the expected residual used in the loan proxy, which necessarily
equals the basis at lease commencement reduced by the return of
capital (depreciation) applied against cash in the loan proxy.
In Table VIII, the total interest is 17.58, compared to 12.58 in
Table VI. The extra 5 of interest taxes 5 of the unrealized gain,
just as under current law. The 5 is taxed more rapidly here than
under current law, as current law spreads the 5 pro rata (1 each
year, as reduced depreciation), while Table VIII taxes the 5 more
quickly (as hidden interest): 1.13, 1.10, 1.05, 0.94, and 0.78 in Years
1 through 5, respectively.
This regime is attractive. It adapts the proposal to used leased
property without requiring a valuation of the property. In fact, the
calculations work identically with new and used, property. As to
realization, this regime parallels current law, so that it would not
" William Andrews suggested that I consider this basic approach.
" Obviously, the ceiling on interest rates suggested in Part I.B.4 would have to apply
differently with used property.
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cause much disruption. Realization is accelerated somewhat, but
this is desirable because it reduces, although does not eliminate,
the significance of the lease/loan distinction.
The suggested approach for dealing with unrealized gain or loss
in used leased property is conceptually inconsistent with the loan
proxy mechanism. The loan proxy treats a lessor as if it transferred
the property to the lessee in exchange for a debt (payable partly in
kind). Extending this view, any lease should result in immediate
taxation of the lessor at lease commencement on all built-in gain or
loss in the leased property at such time. At lease termination, the
lessor would be taxed on all gain or loss in the residual accruing
during the lease term. This approach is not adopted here for a
number of reasons. It is a far more radical departure from current
law than the loan proxy as applied to rent. It also would increase
the tax cost of leasing used property in a troublesome way. The
conceptual inconsistency is not particularly bothersome, since real-
ization and rent taxation are very different kinds of issues, which
present such different kinds of policy concerns. Part IV.A.3 consid-
ers a more complicated alternative to the approach just suggested,
which provides for partial immediate realization to the lessor at
lease commencement in all leases of used property.
As to the lessee, current law provides a deduction for the stated
rent, so that the lessee is not affected by the lessor's gain or loss
taxation. The Table VIII regime builds gain or loss realization into
the loan proxy in a way that makes it unacceptable to use the Ta-
ble VIII loan as the basis for taxing the lessee. For example, using
the Table VIII calculations as the starting point for the lessee's
rent proxy under the proposed reform would allow the lessee an
artificially accelerated deduction because the reduced depreciation
used in calculating economic rent from depreciating the tax basis
rather than the value would be taken into account more slowly
than the increased interest deduction in Table VIII. Specifically,
the lessee's deductions would be 6.28, 6.00, 5.66, 5.25, and 4.76 in
Years 1 through 5, respectively, the same 27.94 total amount as in
Table V, but on an accelerated basis. Similarly, if the lessor has an
unrealized loss, the lessee would have an analogous artificially de-
ferred rent proxy deduction. These rent mistaxations are inconsis-
tent with current law and generally unacceptable. Additionally, the
lessee might not have the information required to apply the les-
sor's treatment.
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The basic problem in applying the loan proxy to a lessee of used
property is that one does not know the principal of the loan (the
value of the machine) or the total last payment (the contribution
to the last payment from the property's expected residual value).
Current law has a rule to deal with the problem of not knowing the
principal of a loan: section 1274.89 It can be expanded to help with
the somewhat more difficult problem here.
Section 1274 reverse engineers a principal for a loan when a loan
is incurred to pay for property which has an uncertain value. When
the payments (i.e., interest and repayments of principal) on a loan
are known, if one assumes an interest rate, regardless of whatever
interest is stated, it is possible to apply present value concepts to
determine the principal of the loan. When section 1274 applies to a
loan, the principal amount that results in the loan providing con-
stant rate interest" at the "applicable federal rate" set by statute
(the yield on U.S. Treasury obligations of similar duration) is
treated as the principal for tax purposes.9 1 This amount is simply
the present value, at the applicable federal rate, of all loan
payments.92
In the current example, in addition to not knowing the* principal,
the total last payment is not known. However, if one knows the
ratio of the residual value to the principal, it still is possible to
perform the calculations. This residual value ratio follows from the
depreciation schedules. For example, if a machine is going to lose
one-third of its value over the lease term, the residual value is two-
thirds of the original value and the residual value ratio is two-
thirds. Once one has determined the residual value ratio, a simple
formula gives the leased property's value:93
" I.R.C. § 1274. Walter Blum suggested a section 1274 approach.
" This Article, like current law, ignores the term structure of interest. See generally Jo-
seph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into
Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 Tax L. Rev. 335 (1990) (discussing the term
structure of interest). Reflecting this complexity would not change the conclusions.
91 Id.
92 I.R.C. § 1274(b).
"3 This formula is derived simply. Assume the following abbreviations:
PV = Present Value
SR = Stated Rent
RVR = Residual Value Ratio
The property is worth the present value of all rent payments plus the present value of the
residual:
VALUE = (PV of SR) + (PV of the value of the residual).
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Value Present Value of Stated Rent(1 - Present Value of Residual Value Ratio)
All present values are determined using the applicable federal
rate. The present value of the residual value ratio is determined on
the basis of the lease term. For convenience, this formula will be
referred to as the "Value Formula." This value is then used in ap-
plying the loan proxy to the lessee.
It is easy to use the Value Formula with regard to the Table VIII
transaction. The residual value ratio is 0.5 and the applicable fed-
eral rate is 10%. Therefore:
21.1848
'Value 2.88 =30.72(1 - 0.3105)
30.72 is the value of the machine. Because here the applicable fed-
eral rate provides economic interest, the formula works perfectly to
reverse engineer a value for the machine. The basic proposal can
therefore be applied using this value so as to allow the lessee a
deduction for economic rent, exactly as in Table VI.
This way of dealing with a lessee of used property seems advisa-
ble. It requires only one calculation, although a rather non-intui-
tive one, in order to tax lessees of new and used property similarly.
Indeed, in this example, lessees of new and used property are
taxed identically. To the extent the applicable federal rate is dif-
ferent from economic interest, the formula does not work perfectly.
The applicable federal rate will almost always be less than eco-
nomic interest, so that using this formula overstates the property's
value, understates the rent in present value terms,9 and overtaxes
the lessee. This inaccuracy does not seem particularly troubling in
light of the associated simplicity and improvement over current
law.
But, the value of the residual = VALUE x RVR, so that:
VALUE (PV of SR) + [PV of (VALUE x RVR)].
PV of (VALUE x RVR) - VALUE x (PV of RVR), so that:
VALUE = (PV of SR) + [VALUE x (PV of RVR)l.
Solving for VALUE gives the formula in the text.
"' Overstating the machine's value increases depreciation's contribution to rent. Deprecia-
tion generally is slower than interest. Thus, in general, overstating the value causes the rent
to be accounted for too slowly.
Taxation of Business Rent
C. Lease Cancellations, Transfers, and Defaults
The market rent for leased property probably varies over the
term of the lease as market conditions change. Nevertheless, cur-
rent law and the instant proposal determine rent at the outset of
the lease, as required by realization notions. The parties' tax treat-
ment is not affected by market changes. However, it is necessary to
reflect a change in market conditions when a lease is cancelled,
when the lessor or lessee transfers the benefits and burdens of the
lease prior to the termination of the lease, or when the lessee de-
faults. A reader with little interest in these esoteric transactions
can skip ahead to Part III.
1. Transfers of Properties Subject to Leases
A transfer by a lessor of its rights under a lease without also
transferring the underlying property, the residual, seems unusual
and is not considered here. Property subject to an outstanding
lease, including the rights of the lessor under the lease,95 fre-
quently is transferred, however. Current law has problems dealing
with this situation,9" whereas the proposed reform deals with it
easily.
Even if the rent in long-term leases generally were accounted for
properly, current law would have problems with the purchase of
property subject to a lease. If there has been any change in market
rent between the commencement of the lease and the time the
leased property is purchased, the rent stated in the lease does not
provide economic rent at the time of purchase. When rents have
gone down, the purchaser pays a premium for the now-above-mar-
ket rent. Current law has trouble deciding whether this premium is
a cost of the lease or a cost of the leased property. 7 When rents
have gone up, the purchaser gets a discount for taking property
with a value that is reduced by a now-below-market lease. Under
current law, that discount probably should be accounted for over
the term of the lease,98 but there is no legal authority for this
" The treatment of the purchaser of a remainder without the rights of the lessor is dis-
cussed in Part IV. A lessee that buys out its lessor is considered in Part II.C.4.
" See Stanley S. Surrey, Paul R. McDaniel, Hugh J. Ault, Stanley A. Koppelman, Fed-
eral Income Taxation 895 (1986) [hereinafter Surrey].
97 See Surrey, supra note 96.
" The purchaser/lessor would be treated as purchasing the property for fair market
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proposition.9
The proposed reform's basic loan proxy views property subject
to a lease as a loan with payments consisting of the rent in the
lease and the residual. It does not matter whether the lease pro-
vides market rent. Thus, the loan proxy would apply readily to a
purchaser of property subject to a lease. The new economics of the
purchaser will be reflected through the new loan proxy, which is
based on the new value of the property, as if not subject to the
lease. Unfortunately, the Value Formula cannot be used to deter-
mine this value here, as the formula assumes market rent.100
Applying the proposed reform to property subject to a lease
eliminates another issue that has presented problems for current
law: purchaser depreciation of lessee improvements.1"' Under the
proposal, lessee improvem6nts are relevant to the taxation of the
purchaser only to the extent that they have an expected residual
value."0 2 The purchaser gets a basis in the improvements at lease
termination equal to their expected value at lease end; determined
at the time of purchase.
The transferor of property subject to a lease would be taxed on
the difference between its adjusted basis in the property trans-
ferred and the amount realized. Part VI considers whether any of
value, subject to the iiability to provide use to the tenant for less than market rent. Over the
term of the lease, the purchaser/lessor would be taxed as if it received market rent, deter-
mined at the time of purchase, each year, and used the difference between this deemed rent
and the stated rent to pay off the liability, including imputed interest.
" See Gerald J. Robinson, Federal Income Taxation of Real Estate T 15.02[l][a] (5th ed.
1988).
"oI See supra note 93.
'o' See Robinson, supra note 99, at 5.12. This issue is closely related to the issue of the
treatment of holders of remainders. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
102 To elaborate, lessee improvements should not be depreciated twice by a purchaser/
lessor: once through an explicit depreciation allowance, and a second time due to the stated
rent being lower because the lessee, and not the original seller/lessor, made the improve-
ments. The proposal avoids this problem. In other words, the purchaser/lessor really is buy-
ing a remainder in lessee improvements, and, over the term of the lease, the remainder
increases in present value as the time for enjoyment comes closer. The remainder does not
begin to depreciate until vested. See infra Part IV.A.2.
The question arises as to a lessor's treatment of lessee improvements. Current law, basi-
cally, taxes the lessor when tenant improvements are in lieu of rent, but not otherwise. See
generally Robinson, supra note 99, at 5.06-5.08. At the termination of the lease, the lessor
has no income, but is allowed no basis in the improvements. I.R.C. §§ 109, 1019; see also
Robinson, supra note 99, at 5.09. This regime is defective, but the problems seem suffi-
ciently small that they are ignored in this Article.
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the amount taxed should be treated as capital gain or loss.
2. Lessee Transfers and Subleases
A lessee can be paid to transfer a lease to a new lessee, presuma-
bly because the lease reflects then below-market rent, or can pay
another to take over a lease, presumably because the lease provides
then above-market rent. ' Current law provides that amounts re-
ceived for transferring a lease are taxable immediately, and there
seems to be no .ready alternative to this regime. Deferring the prior
lessee's tax seems impractical, since, generally, the prior lessee no
longer has any interest in the leased property or any continuing
relationship with the lessor or the new lessee. Part VI considers
whether these amounts should be treated as capital gain, and how
that might affect the conclusions here. The new lessee could treat
the amounts paid to the prior lessee as prepaid rent, subject to the
reform. This would treat the new lessee the same regardless of
whether it buys a lease or enters into a new lease. Unfortunately,
this regime taxes the transaction more than a new lease with iden-
tical terms that is subject to the proposal, so that the lessor is
taxed on a deferred basis, as illustrated in Table VIII, rather than
immediately, as here with the prior lessee. Giving the new lessee an
immediate deduction that would offset the prior lessee's tax so as
to eliminate the overtaxation might be advisable, but would create
tax avoidance possibilities when the new lessee is in a higher tax
bracket than the prior lessee.
Amounts paid by a prior lessee to be relieved from a lease pre-
sent similar problems. The prior lessee would have an immediate
deduction. 104 It would be possible to treat the payment received by
the new lessee as a downward adjustment to future overstated rent
under the instant proposal. This would result in the transaction
being undertaxed, much in the same way the transaction in the
preceding paragraph was overtaxed if the new lessee were required
For simplicity, this Article treats the benefits and burdens under a lease on a net
basis. One also can view a lease transfer as a sale of the benefits in exchange for an assump-
tion of the burdens, with an appropriate adjustment for any cash changing hands, as argua-
bly required by Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
,' The "right" regime might be to deduct these amounts, adjusted for hidden interest,
over the term of the lease to which the prior lessee was a party. This seems unreasonable for
the same reasons that deferring the lessee's income when it sells a lease seemed
unreasonable.
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to defer its deduction. Again, it seems best to tax the payment im-
mediately, although this creates tax avoidance opportunities. Part
VI considers whether this income should be treated as capital gain,
and how that might affect the conclusions here.
A sublease is similar to the transfer of a lease by a lessee. The
sublessee would be taxed under the proposal just as if it entered a
new lease with the owner. The lessee/sublessor would be taxed on
the same gross rent, continuing to deduct rent under the original
loan proxy. Any gain or loss in the lessee/sublessor's lease from the
owner/lessor would be reflected through the lessee/sublessor con-
tinuing to determine its rent deduction with regard to the original
lease under the old loan proxy.
Alternatively, if the sublease extends over the remaining term of
the original lease so that the lessee/sublessor no longer has an in-
terest in the leased property, the lessee/sublessor could just be
taxed using two new, simpler, loan proxies - first, a borrowing of
the present value, at the yield of the original lease, of the remain-
ing rent under the original lease; second, a lending of this present
value in exchange for the payments in the sublease. However, this
simplified calculation would defer the lessee's realization somewhat
compared to true sublessor treatment.
3. Lease Cancellations and Defaults
Lease cancellations, as transactions similar to the lease transfers
just discussed, merit some discussion. 10 5 A lessee can buy its lessor
out of a lease or a lessor can buy its lessee out. Under current law,
when a lessee buys its lessor out of a lease, the lessee has an imme-
diate deduction and the lessor has immediate income.1 06 This is
unobjectionable. Under current law, when a lessor buys its lessee
out, the lessee has immediate income. The lessor has a capitalized
item - capitalized either as a cost of the leased property or as a
cost of a new lease, and depreciated accordingly.10 7 The lessee's
capital gain treatment is discussed in Part VI. This treatment of
the parties makes sense to the extent the payment merely pays the
lessee for the costs of moving and the like. A somewhat different
analysis applies when the payment compensates the lessee for giv-
Io See Robinson, supra note 99, at 5.03, 5.04.
Id. at 5.03.
Id. at 5.04.
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ing up a right to below-market rent. Below-market rent would have
been reflected through increased lessee net income from a smaller
rent deduction, and less lessor rent income, if the lease had not
been cancelled. An immediate lessee tax coupled with a deferred
lessor deduction overtaxes the cancellation and, thus, interferes
with economic behavior. Since it seems hard to tax the lessee over
time, eliminating the overtaxation by giving the lessor an immedi-
ate deduction might be appropriate. Immediate-income/immedi-
ate-deduction treatment would tax a lease that is terminated at a
premium or a discount analogously to current law's treatment of
the retirement of a bond at a premium or a discount.108
A closely-related transaction is a default by one of the parties to
the lease. Lessor default seems unusual, since it would involve re-
moving the lessee from possession of the leased property in viola-
tion of the lease, and is not considered further. Lessee default
would have various tax consequences. With regard to rent taxation,
the lessor would have a bad debt deduction and the lessee would
have discharge-of-indebtedness income to the extent the accrued
rent under the proposal exceeded the rent actually paid. These
items would be appropriately adjusted by any termination penal-
ties and similar lessee payments to the lessor. This treatment basi-
cally conforms the taxation of lessee default to the treatment of
debtor default. As to realizing gain or loss, the lessor's hidden taxa-
tion on unrealized gain or loss would terminate, just as under cur-
rent law. Its basis in the property returned upon the default would
be its basis in the property at the outset reduced by any basis
amounts applied against rent, also as under current law.
4. Lessee Acquisitions of the Leased Property
Part II.C.1 concluded that the law should reflect the reality of
any discount or premium reflected in a purchase of property sub-
ject to a lease. When a lessee buys its lessor out, however, the pur-
chaser is wearing three hats: purchaser, lessor, and lessee. This
should not affect the lessee in its role as purchaser, however. It still
should be treated as buying the property for market value. Any
premium/deduction or discount/hidden income would be taken
08 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c)(1) (borrower deduction upon retiring obligation at a pre-
mium); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (borrower income on retiring
obligation at a discount).
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into account immediately under the general rules for lease termi-
nations described in the preceding section.
III. LEASING AND NON-ECONOMIC ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
The discussion thus far has assumed that current tax law pro-
vides economic depreciation. In fact, for most tangible assets, cur-
rent law provides non-economic accelerated depreciation.'0 9 This
tax preference is allowed in the hope that it will have a social ben-
efit, such as encouraging investment. Some are particularly troub-
led by leasing of property subject to non-economic accelerated de-
preciation. This Part shows that, once one takes into account the
mistaxation of rent, such leasing presents few problems that are
not inherent in the preference itself. Thus, the proposal provides
the foundation for an improved non-economic accelerated depreci-
ation regime for leased property. Conversely, the proposal suggests
a ready way to eliminate preference benefits in leasing transac-
tions, if that is desired. Leveraged leasing and sale-leasebacks also
are discussed.
A. Leasing: Bifurcated Benefits
Current law provides a deduction for depreciation with respect
to many types of assets. When an asset is expected to lose value
through use in a business due to exhaustion, wear and tear, or ob-
solescence, the cost of that asset is deducted over time."0 The cur-
rent rules generally provide deductions in the early years of a de-
preciable tangible asset's life that exceed those that would be
allowed if depreciation tracked the asset's expected decline in mar-
ket value."' In other words, current law's deductions generally are
accelerated compared to economic depreciation. Current law only
provides a fast, not an excessive, write-off over the life of an asset.
The total deduction is the cost of the asset under both economic
'o The discussion in this Article, as is customary in the literature, assumes that actual
economic depreciation is the economic depreciation expected when the property is acquired.
This assumption is consistent with the notion that depreciation is only appropriate for ex-
pected value changes, since the effects of market changes on values generally are not re-
flected until a realization event. See supra Part II.A.
o I.R.C. §§ 167, 168. See also Mundstock, supra note 5, at 1193.
S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 145-47 (1985).
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accounting and current law.' Non-economic accelerated deprecia-
tion, nevertheless, generally provides a net reduction in the present
value of taxes, as earlier deductions generally are more valuable in
present value terms."1 3
Unlike the mistaxation of rent, current law's non-economic ac-
celerated depreciation is intentional."' While taxes generally
should not interfere with economic decisions, the Congress has de-
termined that non-economic accelerated depreciation is appropri-
ate to encourage investment, capital formation, savings, U.S. inter-.
national economic competitiveness, and the like." 5
Some analyses of the taxation of leasing attribute the benefits
from being an owner of leased property to the benefits from accel-
erated depreciation." 6 After all, if the tax system has had no effect
on prices and an owner of leased depreciable property gets extra
tax benefits from depreciation, such ownership is taxed more fa-
vorably than alternate investments, such as stocks and bonds.
The analysis above, however, shows that the current law's rules
for the taxation of rent alone provide a significant tax benefit to
being a lessor. These benefits are in addition to the benefits from
non-economic accelerated depreciation. The basic analysis is fairly
obvious. Assume perfect markets on which taxes have had no net
effect, lessors are allowed non-economic accelerated depreciation,
and the current rules for the taxation of rent apply. Under these
" The text oversimplifies matters a bit. Economic depreciation reflects salvage value,
while current law does not. Id. This means that, under economic accounting, the income on
disposition of the asset will be lower by the amount of the nondepreciated salvage value.
I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1012, 1016(a)(2). Thus, taking taxation on disposition into account, the total
capital recovery is the same under current law and economic accounting.
" This might not be the case, for example, if the taxpayer is in a higher tax bracket in
the later years.
' This ignores small errors (unintentional benefits and burdens) when the current law's
objective approach to depreciation does not reflect the subjective use and maintenance of a
given asset, as discussed supra note 9 and infra note 135.
"' S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. 145-47 (1985). Accelerated depreciation also can be viewed as an ad hoc inflation ad-
justment. Id. This is discussed more completely in Part V.
"' E.g., Macan & Umbrecht, supra note 42, at 313-14; Shrank & Fritch, supra note 32, at
103-104. The leading article, Miller & Upton, supra note 3, concludes that limits on utiliza-
tion of depreciation tax benefits and the now-repealed investment tax credit are the only
explanation of why users prefer leasing, as lower user tax rates would cause the user to buy
with equity and not lease. Miller & Upton, supra note 3, at 785. As discussed supra notes
42-48 and accompanying text, this analysis assumes that the relevant decision is whether to
lease or buy with some equity, when the real decision is whether to lease or buy with debt.
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circumstances, the lessor receives two benefits compared to eco-
nomic treatment: deferred taxation of rent and accelerated depre-
ciation. The lessee is unaffected by the accelerated depreciation,
and, thus, is still overtaxed through a non-economic deferred rent
deduction.
This can be seen in an example. Consider how Table V would
look if the subject machine, which has an economic straight-line
depreciation over ten years with no salvage value, was subject to
the 150% declining balance switching to straight line when more
favorable over a ten year depreciable life with no salvage value or
averaging convention tax depreciation method.1 17
TABLE IX
(2)
L'or
Econ.
Inc.
3.07
2.82
2.54
2.28
1.90
(3)
L'or
Tx'ble
Inc.
0.98
1.67
2.26
2.76
2.93
(4)
L'ee
Econ.
Deduct.
6.14
5.89
5.62
5.31
4.98
(5)
L'ee
Tax
Deduct.
5.59
5.59
5.59
5.59
5.59
The total tax effect to the respective taxpayer (the differences
between the second and third columns and between the fourth and
fifth columns) can be exactly bifurcated into the
taxation of rent and mistaxation of depreciation,
effect from mis-
as follows:
TABLE X
(3) (4)
L'or L'ee
Dep. Tax
Ben. Effect
1.54 0.55
0.85 0.30
0.26 0.02
-0.24 -0.28
-0.40 -0.62
(6)
L'ee
Dep.
Bur.
(5)
L'ee
Rent
Bur.
0.55
0.30
0.02
-0.28
-0.62
' The depreciation would
respectively.
be 4.61, 3.92, 3.33, 2.83, and 2.67 in Years 1 through 5,
Year
(1)
L'or
Tax
Effect
2.09
1.15
0.28
-0.52
-1.03
(2)
L'or
Rent
Ben.
0.55
0.30
0.02
-0.28
-0.62
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Column three is the difference between the preferential depreci-
ation and economic depreciation. The total effect of the mistaxa-
tion of rent shown in the second and fifth columns is derived from
Table V (by subtracting the second column of Table V from the
first and the fifth from the fourth, respectively). Columns one and
four show that the sum of these two effects (rent mistaxation and
non-economic depreciation) to the respective taxpayers equals the
total effect to the taxpayers shown in Table IX. The only differ-
ence between the taxation of Tables V and IX is the extra benefit
to the lessor from accelerated depreciation.
B. Lessor or Lessee Benefits?
Under the analysis in the preceding section, the only issue
presented with respect to non-economic accelerated depreciation in
lease transactions is whether the preference should be provided to
lessors (which is the current law result), to lessees, or to neither.
Unfortunately, given the ill-defined purposes of the current non-
economic accelerated depreciation, this question is unanswerable.
If one assumes the most reasonable purpose, to encourage invest-
ment, lessee or lessor benefits might be appropriate.
In order to analyze the economics of non-economic accelerated
tax depreciation in lease transactions, it is necessary to know the
purposes of the preference. There are nearly as many purposes ar-
ticulated for non-economic accelerated depreciation as there are
taxpayers that benefit from the preference. It is possible to formu-
late a purpose for accelerated depreciation that requires lessor
benefits. For example, lessor benefits would make sense if one
wanted to reward the legal owners of machinery, and one believed
that lessors are not forced to pass through most of the tax benefits
through reduced rent. Conversely, there are purposes that are not
consistent with lessor benefits. For example, benefits for non-cor-
porate lessors make little sense if the purpose of the preference is
to reduce the corporate tax burden on the return on capital used
by corporations, since, due to the rent deduction, the return on the
capital invested in property leased by corporations from non-cor-
porate lessors ' 18 is not subject to the corporate tax. When the Con-
,"8 On 1988 tax returns, corporations deducted over $161 billion in rent and reported as
income approximately $92 billion of rent. Internal Revenue Service, 11 Statistics of Income
Bulletin 58 (1992).
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gress last visited the accelerated depreciation issue, in its consider-
ations that lead to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,119 it seemed to
view the preference primarily as an investment120 incentive.2" This
probably is the best view of the preference.2 2 Consequently, the
instant discussion focuses on non-economic depreciation as an in-
vestment incentive.
In order to evaluate accelerated depreciation benefits in leasing
transactions from an investment incentive perspective, it is neces-
sary to decide who makes the investment decision with regard to
leased property. In the case of a very long-term lease, it seems
clear that the lessee makes the investment decision. The lessee de-
cides whether to use the machine in business; leasing is merely a
financing choice. 23 As leases get shorter, the issue seems more dif-
ficult. 24 Consider a short-term lessor of dictating equipment. The
lessor can be viewed as engaging in a leasing business and investing
in dictating equipment. Each lessee, however, is ultimately using
the equipment. The lessee could just buy the equipment and resell
the equipment when it no longer has a use for it. Thus, again, the
better view is that the lessee makes the investment decision. 25
Under these circumstances, lessees should get the benefit of the
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
120 "Investment" is used in this context to mean the acquisition of a real asset. This usage
is customary in the economics literature. See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Issues in the Design
of Savings and Investment Incentives, in Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of In-
come From Capital 13, 16 (Charles R. Hulten ed. 1981).
"I S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986). The Senate Finance Committee Re-
port is cited because the final act closely resembled the Finance Committee's bill. H.R. Rep.
No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-38 - 11-39 (1986) (Conference Report).
Interestingly, in 1981 Congress enacted special "safe-harbor" leasing (now-repealed) dis-
cussed infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text, to facilitate lessee benefits from non-
economic accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit. S. Rep. No. 144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 61-63 (1981); H.R. Rep. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 217-18 (1981). The
now-repealed investment tax credit was not allowed to most long-term non-corporate les-
sors, but this was an anti-tax shelter rule, not a rule intended to assure that lessors not
making investment decisions not receive tax benefits. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B); S. Rep. No. 437,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1971).
... See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 210 (1986).
123 See Miller & Upton, supra note 3.
Leasing to consumers presents special problems. For example, one has to take into
account that an equity-financed acquisition of consumer goods avoids tax. See, e.g., Miller &
Upton, supra note 3, at 783-84. Consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article, however. See supra note 4.
"I See Miller & Upton, supra note 3.
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preference. Denying the preference in leasing transactions would
undermine the efficiency, of the preference by discriminating
against investment in leased assets. Denying preference benefits
also is not acceptable as a rough justice way of dealing with the
mistaxation of rent because, as illustrated in Table X, there is
likely to be little relationship between the amount of benefits from
rent mistaxation and the amount of benefits from accelerated
depreciation.
This does not mean that the preference must appear on lessee
returns. Lessees enjoy benefits on lessors' returns when these bene-
fits are passed through to lessees through reduced rent. ' a This
might even be a more desirable way to provide preference benefits
to some lessees. Some lessees might have tax losses or otherwise
might not be in a position to enjoy benefits on their returns.
Passed-through lessor benefits assure that such lessees are not dis-
criminated against by being denied preference benefits. 127
This suggests that it might be appropriate to have the prefer-
ence generally appear on lessor returns if one believes that the
benefits are passed through. Before considering the incidence of
lessor benefits, however, it is helpful to consider who generally
benefits from non-economic accelerated depreciation. The prefer-
ence makes sense as an investment incentive only if one believes
that owner/users of depreciable property generally enjoy the
benefits.' 21
Even in a world where owner/users generally enjoy most of the
benefits of non-economic accelerated depreciation, it seems likely
that lessors pass a large portion of their benefits through to lessees.
Under the owner/users-keep-the-benefits assumption, depreciable
,26 Perfect pass-through would take into account not only the tax effects of non-economic
accelerated depreciation, but also the tax effects of the resulting change in the stated rent.
This could happen only if all lessors and lessees are in the same marginal tax bracket and
the only effect of the preference was on pre-tax rent. In this case, the rent would be reduced
each year by the tax savings, or, similarly, increased each year by the tax increase, from
accelerated depreciation for the year, grossed-up by the tax rate to reflect that the lessor is
saving tax on the reduced rent and that the lessee is losing deductions because of the re-
duced rent.
S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 61-62 (1981).
32$ This is not necessarily the case - for example, the tax preference might make owners
of depreciable property willing to pay more for the property, pushing up the price so that
sellers and manufacturers capture some of the benefits - but since the preference is a via-
ble investment incentive only if most of the benefits generally are enjoyed by owners, this is
assumed.
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property provides an above-market after-tax return. Potential les-
sors as a class do not have unlimited access to investments provid-
ing this return. Thus, as potential lessors compete for this most
desirable investment, potential lessees will be able to demand
lower rents. These lower rents will result in lessees capturing more
of the tax benefits.
In 1981, the Congress enacted "safe-harbor" leasing (but re-
pealed it the following year):12 Leases with absurd rent streams
were treated as leases and not as loans, permitting the wholesale
creation of tax benefits in low tax bracket lessee transactions that
were not available to mere owner/users of property.13 ° There is evi-
dence that lessors captured a large portion - in the neighborhood
of 20% - of the total tax benefits, i.e., non-economic rent and
non-economic accelerated depreciation.131 This does not prove that
lessors capture a large portion of the accelerated depreciation ben-
efits, however. Accelerated depreciation benefits, although perhaps
less valuable benefits, would be available to the lessee if the lessee
purchased the property outright. In contrast, the benefits of rent
mistaxation exist only if a lessor is involved. Thus, it is possible
that lessors and lessees share the benefits from non-economic ac-
celerated depreciation differently from the way they share rent
mistaxation benefits.
In short, while accelerated depreciation benefits should be al-
lowed in leasing transactions, it is not clear whether they should be
allowed on lessee or lessor returns, as both treatments present
problems. Providing benefits on lessee returns would cause some
lessees to get inadequate benefits, would effect a change from cur-
rent law, and might end up indirectly benefitting lessors anyway.
Providing benefits on lessor returns seems to make it more likely
that lessors inappropriately capture benefits. The next section
shows how the proposal can reach either result.
This analysis does not defend non-economic accelerated depreci-
ation for leased assets. I oppose the preference for reasons beyond
the scope of this Article. The point is that lessor benefits make
29 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Reve-
nue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 49-62 (Comm. Print
1982) [hereinafter 1982 Bluebook].
30 Warren & Auerbach, supra note 29, at 1764-69.
"' See Emil M. Sunley, Depreciation and Leasing Under the New Tax Law, 35 Nat'l Tax
J. 287, 289 (1982).
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nearly as much sense as benefits to an owner/user. If one is both-
ered by lessor benefits, one should be bothered by benefits to any
taxpayer.
Some lessees are perceived as inappropriate objects of an invest-
ment incentive. For example, investment by governments might
need no incentive. Some believe that tax-exempt organizations
should receive no tax benefit in addition to their exemption, such
as an indirect accelerated depreciation benefit from leasing. ' On
the other hand, a reduction in the tax benefits available in leasing
transactions in which the lessee is a government or a tax-exempt
organization could have the effect that these entities face a higher
relative risk-adjusted cost of capital with regard to leasing than
with regard to alternate means of securing the use of capital, which
might be troubling.1 33. Any judgment here requires an analysis of
the investment decisions of these entities that is beyond the scope
of this Article. The proposal will apply in the same way regardless
of the identity of the lessee.
C. Application of the Proposal
The question arises whether the proposal makes any sense in a
world with tax non-economic accelerated depreciation.' 3 ' After all,
if depreciation is mistaxed, why care about rent mistaxation? The
answer is suggested in Table X. Without reform of the taxation of
rent, lease transactions have more benefits than other financings of
depreciable property. This undermines the efficiency of the prefer-
ence. Only with rent taxation rules working properly will the pref-
erence work properly. 13
5
131 1984 Bluebook, supra note 24, at 43-46. Current law reflects this notion in I.R.C. §§
168(h), 7701(e).
"I' See Galper & Toder, supra note 47, at 258-60.
'3' Boris Bittker called this concern to my attention.
"I A given property's depreciation depends on how it is used and maintained by the tax-
payer. See supra note 9. Current law ignores this subjective aspect of depreciation as to
most tangible property and provides objective depreciation that is independent from the use
and maintenance of the property. I.R.C. § 168. This means, for example, that taxpayers that
use property more than the typical owner of the same type of property get inadequate de-
preciation. The proposal also works objectively, which accomplishes the same simplicity de-
sired for current law. Moreover, any unintended benefits or burdens from the current objec-
tive approach would be reduced in leasing transactions, as the proposal would match excess
statutory depreciation with extra rent, and inadequate depreciation with inadequate rent.
Eliminating these benefits and burdens is attractive. It would leave some vitality in the
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With a few modifications, the proposal adapts to a non-economic
accelerated depreciation regime. Moreover, the proposed reform
facilitates improvements in the application of non-economic accel-
erated depreciation in leasing transactions, regardless of one's
views of the desirability of, and purposes for, the tax preference.
The most obvious way to deal with accelerated depreciation is to
adopt the basic approach used to deal with unrealized gain or loss
in Table VIII: take the tax accounts for the leased property at face
value. There, the tax basis was used even though it was not the
value of the leased property, while, here, the tax accounts can be
used even though, as to the residual, they do not reflect economic
depreciation. This can be illustrated with the ongoing example.
Consider how the proposal would apply to the transaction in Table
IX. The loan proxy would be for 30.72 and provide payments of
5.59 for the first four years and of 18.95 for the fifth (5.59 cash
plus 13.36 residual determined using the accelerated depreciation).
This loan provides interest of 8.69%, the lower interest reflecting
the benefits of the accelerated depreciation. Then, the loan proxy
looks as follows:
TABLE XI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Balance Interest Payments
1 30.72 2.67 5.59
2 27.80 2.42 5.59
3 24.63 2.14 5.59
4 21.18 1.84 5.59
5 17.44 1.51 18.95
The lessor would have a basis of 13.36 in the residual at lease
termination.
Unfortunately, the income figures in the third column of Table
XI are troubling. Comparing these numbers to the economic in-
come (the second column in Table IX) shows that the Table XI
regime provides roughly 0.40 of extra depreciation a year. This
both eliminates rent mistaxation and provides the extra 2.00 of de-
ductions over five years that are built into the statutory deprecia-
tion schedule. The level nature of the benefit in table XI is a coin-
lease/loan distinction, however, as the benefits and burdens would still arise outside the
leasing context.
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cidence. This 2.00 extra benefit is provided much more slowly in
Table XI than in- the depreciation schedule (the third column of
Table X), however. Table XI treats the 2.00 as a reduction in in-
terest that reduces income much less in Years 1 through 3 than
under the depreciation schedule. In fact, the deferral of the depre-
ciation in Table XI is so great that Table XI provides less generous
treatment than the second column of Table V, which merely re-
flects current law's mistaxation of rent. If non-economic acceler-
ated depreciation is to be allowed, there seems to be little reason
to have it so cut back in some leasing transactions. Also, in other
leasing transactions, the opposite happens - treating the acceler-
ated depreciation as interest has the effect of speeding up the ex-
tra depreciation.13 6 In short, while treating unrealized gain or loss
as an adjustment to interest was acceptable in Part II because real-
ization is such an inaccurate art and because current law's treat-
ment as reduced depreciation is so arbitrary, treating non-eco-
nomic accelerated depreciation as interest here changes the benefit
in lease transactions arbitrarily and seems unacceptable.' 37
In light of this analysis, if the tax code generally provides non-
economic accelerated depreciation, special economic depreciation
schedules would be required in order to determine the expected
residual value used in applying the proposal. 38 This should not be
too burdensome. Current law's accelerated schedules are derived
from economic schedules, so that assets of various economic lives
receive roughly the same amount of preference.1 39 The proposal
merely would require that these economic depreciation schedules
be made public. Alternatively, the slower depreciation allowed for
minimum tax or earnings and profits purposes'40 could be used as
a proxy for economic depreciation.
The reform then can be adapted to any approach to non-eco-
nomic accelerated depreciation. For example, if one is opposed to
accelerated depreciation in leasing transactions, the proposal
makes it easy to eliminate any benefits, since, with no further ad-
An example is set out in Mundstock, supra note 1, at 357.
131 Also, as with Table VIII, the Table XI regime could not apply to the lessee, creating
further problems.
'38 A rather unsatisfactory way to avoid economic depreciation schedules is discussed in
Mundstock, supra note 1, at 358.
139 S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986).
"' I.R.C. §§ 56(a)(1), 168(g), 312(k).
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justments, it would automatically eliminate lessor benefits. Lessee
benefits would be eliminated by requiring lessees to use the same
economic depreciation schedules that are used in determining the
residual for purposes of the economic loan proxy.
It is easy to give the benefits of non-economic accelerated depre-
ciation directly to lessees. Lessors would simply determine their
economic income under the economic loan proxy. Lessees would
calculate interest under the economic loan proxy, but use the non-
economic accelerated depreciation as. their depreciation."" This
would be a considerable improvement over current law. Extra ben-
efits from rent mistaxation in leasing transactions would be elimi-
nated. Lessees would be allowed to claim benefits on their returns.
Thus, lessees who can benefit from the preferential deductions no
longer would need to rely on negotiating reduced rent to receive an
investment incentive. The lease/loan distinction would have little
significance.
This lessees benefit regime can be illustrated with the ongoing
example. The lessor would be taxed as in Table VI. The lessee's
tax would be as follows:
TABLE XII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proxy
Loan Accelerated Total
Year Interest Depreciation Deduction
1 3.07 4.61 7.68
2 2.82 3.92 6.74
3 2.54 3.33 5.87
4 2.24 2.83 5.07
5 1.91 2.67 4.58
29.94
At the end of the lease, the lessee has only expended 27.94, but has
deducted 29.94. It would recapture as taxable income the 2.00 of
excess depreciation at that time.
In Table XII, the total deduction exceeds the economic deduc-
tion in Table V by 1.54, 0.85, 0.25, -0.25, and -0.40 in Years 1
through 5, respectively. The total extra 2.00 of depreciation is
given to the lessee in exactly the same fashion that it is given to an
'' Issues presented when there are multiple lessees are beyond the scope of this Article.
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owner of property (as shown in the third column of Table X).
Matters are only somewhat more difficult if it is desired to give
preference benefits to lessors in the first instance. The proposal
would be modified to provide one additional adjustment to a les-
sor's income - it would be adjusted by the difference between the
preferential depreciation and economic depreciation. This adjust-
ment would be easy to calculate from the non-economic acceler-
ated depreciation schedules and the economic schedules provided
to implement the reform, as shown in the third column of Table
X.142
If this regime is applied to the Table XII lessor, matters are as
follows:
TABLE XIII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proxy
Loan Excess Net
Year Interest Depreciation Income
1 3.07 1.54 1.53
2 2.82 0.85 1.97
3 2.54 0.25 2.29
4 2.24 -0.25 2.49
5 1.91 -0.40 2.31
10.60
At the end of the lease, the lessor's basis would be 13.36 (reflecting
the 2.00 of extra depreciation). The lessee would be taxed as in
Table V.
In Table XIII, the total net income is the same as under current
law (the third column of Table IX). Here, however, the lessor only
gets the deferral of income resulting from accelerated depreciation,
while current law gives that deferral as well as the deferral from
the mistaxation of rent (as shown in Table X).
D. Used Property and Realization
The presence of non-economic accelerated depreciation does not
142 A separate adjustment for the preference is required, since the proxy for economic
depreciation varies from transaction to transaction depending upon the stated rent. It might
be that different adjustments should be provided depending upon the length of the lease.
Current law does not worry about this refinement. I.R.C. § 168.
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materially change the basic analysis of realization.' 3 Under any
reasonable purpose for the preference, the amount of tax benefits
should not be affected by whether or when the ownership of the
property changes hands.""' Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve
this. Current law does not even come close. 14 5 For example, under
current law, the sale of a relatively new piece of property that has
been subject to non-economic accelerated depreciation will trigger
a tax to the seller that reduces the benefits of the preference. The
buyer will get more tax benefits than the seller would have, which
probably is reflected in a somewhat higher price that compensates
the seller somewhat for its tax. However, the current tax on the
seller usually will be greater in present value than the buyer's ben-
efits. Realization reduces the tax preference. Consequently, current
law's realization regime prevents the proper functioning of the ac-
celerated depreciation preference in rather arbitrary ways. Under
these circumstances, it seems best to just design realization rules
here that interfere with economic decisions as little as possible,
and not pay too much attention to the tax preference. The ap-
proaches in Parts II and III should be used simultaneously with
used property subject to accelerated depreciation: As to the lessor,
the adjusted tax basis at lease commencement is used to determine
loan proxy. Excess depreciation also can be allowed the lessor if
that is desired. As to the lessee, the interest component of the loan
proxy is based on the value determined using the Value Formula
and on economic depreciation. The lessee then claims economic or
accelerated depreciation, depending upon whether the lessee is to
get preference benefits.
E. Leverage and Sale-Leasebacks
Long-term lease transactions frequently have one or both of two
additional features: (1) the lessor debt-financing much of its in-
3 See Alan J. Auerbach, Inflation and the Tax Treatment of Firm Behavior, 71 Am.
Econ. Rev. - Papers and Proceedings 419, 420 (1981); Gerard Brannon & Emil Sunley, Jr.,
The "Recapture" of Excess Tax Depreciation on the Sale of Real Estate, 29 Nat'l Tax J. 413
(1976); Roger H. Gordon, James R. Hines, Jr., & Lawrence H. Summers, Notes on the Tax
Treatment of Structures, in The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation 223, 228-37
(Martin Feldstein ed. 1987).
,' See supra Part III.B.
... See Mundstock, supra note 5, at 1210-14.
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vestment (a leveraged lease)146 and (2) the lessor acquiring the
leased property from the lessee (a sale-leaseback). The presence of
these additional features does not materially change the analysis
above.
1. Leverage
Leverage presents two issues: First, since in a leveraged lease the
lessor resembles a conduit between the lender and the lessee,
should this resemblance change the lessor's tax treatment? Second,
does leverage present particular problems with respect to non-eco-
nomic accelerated depreciation of leased property? The answer to
both questions is "no."
Consider the most extreme example of leveraged leasing: a lessor
finances its entire investment in the leased property on a non-re-
course basis, with the lease extending the entire economic life of
the property and with the rent exactly servicing the debt. All the
lessor does is collect rent and promptly turn it over to the lender
as debt service. This lessor looks very much like a conduit between
its lender and the lessee.
This 'transaction is no more troubling from a rent mistaxation
perspective than any other long-term lease. Assume that the rate
of the implicit interest in the lease mirrors the rate of interest on
the loan, that the tax law provides economic depreciation, and that
the tax law has had no effect on prices. As noted above, a good
proxy for economic accounting would treat the lessor as a lender,
so that, under economic accounting, the lessor would be treated, in
effect, as borrowing and relending the same amount. The interest
in the two loans would be equal, and would offset. Consequently,
there would be no net effect on the lessor's taxes. In other words,
the transaction provides the lessor no economic profit or loss, so
that each year the lessor has no income or loss under economic
accounting. Consequently, if the lessor gets material benefits under
current law, they must be attributable either to current law's mis-
taxation of rent or to non-economic accelerated depreciation, or
both. Lessor benefits in a leveraged lease are the same benefits
available to any lessor. It merely is easier to see the current defects
' See Shrank & Fritch, supra note 32, at 106-109.
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with regard to a leveraged lease.14 7
A number of commentators believe that non-economic acceler-
ated depreciation with regard to leveraged assets is particularly
troubling.'4" As discussed above, assuming that non-economic ac-
celerated depreciation is an investment incentive, one is troubled
by the preference appearing on lessor tax returns to the extent one
believes that the benefits do not flow through to lessees through
reduced rent. It is hard to see how the presence of a lender makes
it less likely that the lessor passes the tax benefits through. The
concern for leveraged leasing seems misdirected.
One important qualification to this analysis must be noted.
Leveraged non-economic accelerated depreciation property is most
troubling when the lessor's investment is a package that the lessor
would not put together itself, so that the packaging causes the les-
sor to take special risks.'49 It might be easier to package a lever-
aged lease than an equity-financed lease, since a smaller lessor in-
vestment is required. 5 ° If so, special restrictions on at least some
leveraged leasing might be appropriate. This in no way reduces the
need to reform the taxation of rent, however.
2. Sale-Leasebacks
When the lessor acquires the leased property from the lessee, the
resemblance between a long-term lessor and a long-term lender is
particularly obvious. The instant analysis of rent taxation con-
cludes that long-term lessors generally should be taxed like lend-
ers. Sale-leasebacks do not present a special case. 5' Realization
"' Thus, any limits on leveraged leasing are inappropriate, as they would provide an im-
plicit tax penalty on transactions that are indistinguishable from nonpenalized transactions,
which would undesirably distort economic behavior.
"" For a summary of this controversy and the most thoughtful analysis, see Alan J.
Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a
Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax 195 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A.
Pechman eds. 1988).
", Auerbach, supra note 148, at 210-14.
'50 The rise of the leveraged tax shelter certainly suggests this.
's, There is one very real tax problem presented by sale-leasebacks, particularly a lessee/
seller-financed leveraged sale-leaseback. The lessee/seller/lender and lessor/buyer/borrower
play many roles. If the lessee and lessor are in different tax postures, they might be able to
reduce their total taxes even more than is normally possible with a long-term lease by blur-
ring the lines between the roles. For example, if the lessor can benefit from deductions more
than the lessee can, they have an incentive to overstate the purchase price so as to increase
lessor depreciation deductions. The increased price would increase the lessee's income, but
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concerns with regard to sale-leasebacks are discussed in Part IV.B
below.
IV. TERMS FOR YEARS AND REMAINDERS
The sale of a term for years closely resembles a long-term lease.
An example: REMAINDER owns a machine, and Possessory Inter-
est Holder ("PIH") buys a term for years in the machine from RE-
MAINDER. 5 ' PIH resembles a lessee, while REMAINDER resem-
bles a lessor. Nevertheless, current law taxes this transaction quite
differently from the. parallel lease transaction. Compared to eco-
nomic treatment, REMAINDER is overtaxed, while PIH is un-
dertaxed, but not as much as REMAINDER is overtaxed. In the
parallel lease transaction, the lessor is undertaxed, while the lessee
is overtaxed by the exact amount that the lessor is undertaxed.
Both the mistaxation of sales of terms for years, as compared to
economic treatment, and the different treatment of these transac-
tions and the similar lease transactions are troubling. The reform
suggested above for long-term leases facilitates reform here. '53
A. Sales of Terms for Years
1. Taxation of the Possessory Interest Holder
Current law inadvertently provides tax benefits to PIH, as com-
pared to a regime that exactly taxes economic income. In order to
see this, it is necessary to consider the economics of PIH's term for
years. To simplify exposition, this section assumes that there is no
the lessee might pay little or no tax on this income. There need be no non-tax economic
consequences of the increased price because of the many roles of the lessor and lessee. The
above-market price can be offset by below-market interest. This trade-off works if the tax
depreciation method is faster than current law's constant rate deduction of interest. More
simply, the inflated price can be represented by non-recourse debt which is never to be paid.
Current law contains a number of limitations on these abuses, but since they are only indi-
rectly related to the taxation of rent, they are not considered further.
"' This transaction usually is seen in real estate transactions, but, for consistency, is dis-
cussed here in the context of a machine.
"' The discussion here does not consider other types of interests in property that are
similar to those discussed, such as life estates, production payments, and interests created
through trusts and estates. See Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and
BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income In-
terests, 31 Tax L. Rev. 121 (1976); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Income Tax Consequences of Sales
of Present Interests and Future Interests: Distinguishing Time from Space, 49 Ohio St. L.J.
1 (1988). It can be noted, however, that the instant methodology should apply. If economic
accounting were applied, regardless of whether these arrangements are viewed as loans or as
property interests, the tax results should be the same.
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unrealized gain or loss in the property at the time the term for
years is sold or terminates. Realization issues are considered later
in this Part.
The cost of a term for years should equal the present value of
economic rent over the term."' In a given year, the economic de-
preciation of the term is the decline in the value of the term equal
to the difference between the present value of the remaining eco-
nomic rent at the beginning of, the year and this present value at
the end of the year. This net loss of value can be viewed as result-
ing from two partially offsetting effects. First, each year, the term
for years loses value because the value of the rent for the current
year has been enjoyed, so that there are fewer years left to the
term. Second, this gross loss in value is offset in part by an in-
crease in value, because the present value of the remaining years
increases as a result of becoming closer in time. Under this view,
economic depreciation of the term for years for a given year equals
the economic rent for that year reduced by the increase in the pre-
sent value of future years' rent; that increase, in effect, is economic
interest on the investment in the future years' rent.155
This makes sense. PIH's deduction should be smaller than that
of a lessee for economic rent. PIH has an investment in the term
for years that earns implicit interest which reduces the net cost. To
look at the transaction the other way, PIH's deduction should be
greater than an owner's economic depreciation. PIH's 15roperty
loses all of its value over the term, while an owner benefits from an
increasing residual value.
The facts of Table I can be used to illustrate these economics.
Assume that PIH buys a five-year term in a new machine for 21.18
(the present value at 10% of five years' economic rent). Matters
are as follows:
154 This assumes, of course, no tax effect on prices. The discussion of the term for years
transaction owes much to comments from Daniel Halperin.
... See George Mundstock, Eleventh Circuit Affirms Accelerated Depreciation of Land?,
47 Tax Notes 737, 737-39 (May 7, 1990). The text oversimplifies matters somewhat to facili-
tate exposition in that the current year's rent also increases in value during the year. For
example, the last month's rent increases in value during the first eleven months.
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TABLE XIV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value EcDep. Econ. Int.
Year of TfY of TfY Rent on TfY Rnt-Int
1 21.18 4.03 6.14 2.12 4.03
2 17.16 4.12 5.84 1.72 4.12
3 13.04 4.23 5.53 1.30 4.23
4 8.81 4.34 5.22 0.88 4.34
5 4.47 4.47 4.92 0.45 4.47
Table I supplies the economic rent in the fourth column. The
present value of the total amount of rent for the remainder of the
term for years at the beginning of each year is shown in the second
column. This value drops each year, as shown in the third column.
Eachyear's interest (the fifth column) is simply 10% (the assumed
interest rate) of the value of the term at the beginning of the year
(the second column). Note that the sixth column (economic rent
from the third column less the interest in the fourth column)
equals the third column (decline in value of the term), as just
suggested.
Table XIV shows that the economic depreciation of a term for
years is slower than the depreciation of the underlying property, so
that when the underlying property has level economic depreciation
- and frequently even when the underlying property has acceler-
ated economic depreciation - the economic depreciation of a term
for years is slower than straight-line. This might be the most sur-
prising result in this Article.
Compare Table XIV with Table I. As Table I shows, the eco-
nomic depreciation of the underlying property allows for the loss
of the value of the current year's rent, but also implicitly taxes the
increase in the value of future years' rent by reducing the deduc-
tion from the economic rent by the economic interest. After all, if
rent equals depreciation plus interest, depreciation must equal
rent minus interest. In Table I, the second column minus the
fourth"5 6 equals the third. The depreciation of a term for years also
equals the economic tent minus the economic interest,"5 7 but the
interest subtracted is smaller with a term for years than with out-
"'e The net income figures in Table I are interest on the net investment, which necessarily
equals the increase in value of the remaining rent.
,' See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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right ownership, since there are fewer future years - less capital
- earning interest. The term for years does not contain the re-
mainder. Thus, not only will the amount of depreciation of a term
for years for a given year be greater than the amount of deprecia-
tion of the underlying property, but also, due to compounding ef-
fects, the term for years depreciates more slowly, since the smaller
reduction for interest with the term for years falls off more rapidly
than the larger reduction with outright ownership falls off. In other
words, in getting from the rent for the underlying property to its
depreciation, economic interest on the remainder, which grows
with compounding, must be subtracted, whereas this subtraction is
not taken into account in getting from the rent to the depreciation
of the term for years, so that the depreciation of the term for years
is slower. This is considered further in the next section of this
Article.
Current law allows PIH to depreciate the term for years on a
straight-line basis.'58 On the facts of Table XIV, this would be 4.23
per year. Current law can be quite generous to PIH compared to
economic accounting.
This point can be reinforced by viewing a term for years as a
loan by PIH to REMAINDER that is to be repaid with interest by
rent-free use of the property. With this characterization, under ec-
onomic accounting, PIH would deduct economic rent and be taxed
on interest on the loan. Table XIV shows that this is equivalent to
economic depreciation of the term for years. Since PIH's loan is
greatest up front, the reduction in the rent deduction is greatest in
the early years. Thus, as long as the economic rent is not extraordi-
narily accelerated, depreciation of the term for years will be quite
slow.
There is yet another way to look at the current defects, A term
for years resembles coupons (payable in kind) stripped from a
bond. Current law treats stripped coupons as if they were a new
zero-coupon (no-interest) loan with an issue price (tax principal)
equal to the cost of the coupons. 5 9 This provides for slow recovery
of the cost, because of the constant rate accounting for interest. In
... Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(a). There is an untenable argument that the owner of the term
for years depreciates the entire property, and not just the term for years. See Kwall, supra
note 153, at 49-50.
,' I.R.C. § 1286(a).
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contrast, current law provides straight-line depreciation for terms
for years. The insights reflected in the coupon-stripping rules are
not reflected in the taxation of terms for years.
The slower the depreciation of the underlying asset, the worse
current law works. Under these circumstances, current law is par-
ticularly troublesome with regard to nondepreciable land. Consider
a five-year term in land worth 30.72 under the economic assump-
tions underlying Table I. Each year, the rent would be 3.07, so that
the term would cost 11.65 (the present value at 10% of five annual
payments of 3.07). Then, matters are as follows:
TABLE XV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EcDep. Econ. Int.
Year of TfY Rent on TfY Rnt-Int
1 1.91 3.07 1.16 1.91
2 2.10 3.07 0.97 2.10
3 2.31 3.07 0.76 2.31
4 2.54 3.07 0.53 2.54
5 2.79 3.07 0.28 2.79
Current law allows a level annual deduction of 2.33, providing
quite a non-economic tax benefit.
The proposal deals nicely with the depreciation of the term for
years. All that is required is to treat PIH like a lessee and to treat
the cost of the term for years as prepaid rent. On the facts of Ta-
ble XIV, PIH is treated as buying the property for 21.18 plus an
obligation to pay 15.36 (the expected residual value) at the end of
Year 5. The current purchase price is 30.72, the 21.18 plus the 9.54
present value of 15.36 (the amount loaned). The loan then accrues
interest (discount) at 10% for five years until its balance is 15.36
at the end of Year 5. Each year, the total deduction is economic
depreciation plus interest (current accrued discount), as follows:
TABLE XVI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Loan Balance Interest Depreciation Deduction
1 9.54 0.95 3.07 4.03
2 10.50 1.05 3.07 4.12
3 11.55 1.15 3.07 4.22
4 12.70 1.27 3.07 4.34
5 13.97 1.40 3.07 4.47
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Note that the deduction in the fifth column of Table XVI is the
same as in Table XIV. A purchaser of the term for years from PIH
would be taxed similarly.160
Thus far in this Article, it has not been necessary to apply the
proposal with regard to land. Table XV demonstrates that when
there is a hidden loan in a land transaction, such as in a term for
years transaction, the proposal would be aconsiderable improve-
ment over current law. The remainder of the discussion in this
Part also applies to land.
2. Taxation of the Holder of the Remainder
Current law overtaxes REMAINDER more than it undertaxes
PIH. Fortunately, reform with regard to REMAINDER is as easy
as above With regard to PIH.
There is no income-relevant event at the instant when the term
for years is sold. The transaction does have the effect of generating
income subsequently, however. REMAINDER is left holding only
a remainder, and there is income hidden in it. The remainder in-
creases in value with time as the day when the remainder ripens
into outright ownership comes closer. As noted above, a term for
years transaction resembles a stripping of coupons off a bond,
where the principal (remainder) is effectively a zero coupon obliga-
tion that is payable in kind. Under this view, REMAINDER has
economic income each year equal to the increase in the value of the
obligation.' 6 ' Thus, economic accounting would not tax REMAIN-
DER at the time of sale, but would tax it each year on the income
hidden in the remainder.
This can be illustrated by looking-at the facts of Table XIV from
the point of view of REMAINDER. REMAINDER owns property
worth 30.72. It sells a term for years for 21.18, retaining a remain-
der worth 9.54. At the end of Year 5, the machine will be returned,
160 Transfers of leases between new and old 'lessees is discussed supra Part II.C.2.
101 Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 153, at 123-26; Kwall, supra note 153, at 22. Taxing this
income would not violate the realization notion discussed in Part II.A. The realization no-
tion is that gain or losses from changes in market conditions are not taxed as they accrue,
but at an appropriate event. Depreciation does not violate this notion, because depreciation
is for expected, not actual, loss in value. The current original issue discount rules do not
violate this notion because they are based on expected, not actual, increases in value. 1982
Bluebook, supra note 129, at 158-61. Similarly here, the economic accounting is based on
expected increases in value and is consistent with realization notions.
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when it will be worth 15.36. Thus, the remainder increases in value
5.82 (from its Year 1 value of 9.55 to its Year 5 value of 15.36), as
follows:
TABLE XVII
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Rem.Disc EconRent TfY Int EconDep Rnt-Int-Dep
1 0.95 6.14 2.12 3.07 0.95
2 1.05 5.83 1.71 3.07 1.05
3 1.15 5.53 1.30 3.07 1.15
4 1.27 5.22 0.88 3.07 1.27
5 1.40 4.91 0.45 3.07 1.40
5.82
The second column is the hidden interest (accruing discount) in
the remainder, calculated by applying the assumed 10% interest to
the original 9.54 cost plus previously accrued interest. This interest
income is relatively small because the table reflects a relatively
small remaining investment by REMAINDER (9.54 at the out-
set).162 Such small interest income is not troubling, since it merely
reflects that 15.36 (five years' economic depreciation) was applied
against the 21.18 payment, leaving 5.82 taxed. Note that the hid-
den interest income to REMAINDER each year exactly equals the
extra deduction to PIH from allowing a deduction for economic
depreciation of the term for years rather than for the smaller eco-
nomic depreciation of the underlying property (the third column of
Table XVI). Thus, under economic accounting, the total effect to
the two taxpayers is a deduction for economic depreciation of the
underlying property.
Table XVII makes an additional point. REMAINDER can be
viewed as borrowing 21.18, to be repaid, plus interest, in rent. The
fourth column is the interest on the unpaid balance of this loan.
Under this view, REMAINDER would be taxed on economic rent
and deduct interest on the loan and economic depreciation. This is
the sixth column. The third and fifth columns are taken from Ta-
ble I and used to calculate the sixth column. Note that the sixth
column equals the second column (hidden interest on the
remainder).
... REMAINDER also has the 21.18 it received for the term for years in the bank, plus
interest.
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Current law takes a different tack. It treats the sale of the term
for years as a receipt of prepaid rent that is immediately taxable,
with no immediate basis recovery, but, presumably, with deprecia-
tion deductions over the term. No tax results when the remainder
vests.' This regime effects an overtaxation. "e The economic in-.
come is taxed well before it is earned. Moreover, the overtaxation
of REMAINDER always exceeds the undertaxation of PIH: PIH
gets a small speed-up of part of its deduction, while REMAINDER
gets a complete acceleration of all gross income into Year 1, which
is offset in part by depreciation in later years.
Reform here is not difficult, as shown in Table XVII. All that is
needed is to inform the treatment of the term for years transaction
with the ideas underlying the current rules for coupon stripping.
REMAINDER would be taxed as if it held a zero coupon bond
with an issue price equal to the market value of the remainder at
its creation and with a redemption price at maturity equal to the
expected value of the remainder at the end of the term for years.
In order to do this calculation, it is necessary to determine only
one fact that is not obvious: the market value of the entire prop-
erty at the time the remainder is created, which can be done by
using the Value Formula. Then, the current value of the remainder
63 See Kwall, supra note 153, at 17-19 (There apparently is an argument that there is a
taxable event when a remainder vests in possession, but this is not the better view of the
law).
"' Since the amount taxed currently is the present value of the future rent using a pre-
tax discount rate, the current tax necessarily equals the pre-tax present value of all taxes, at
the same rate as the tax on the immediate inclusion, on the future rent using the same pre-
tax discount rate. Thus, at first glance, current law seems correct. This is the wrong way to
analyze the transaction, however. At the beginning of the lease, REMAINDER would need
to set aside an amount equal to the after-tax present value of future taxes on rent, which is
larger than the pre-tax present value, in order to set aside enough money to pay the future
taxes on the rent. Looking solely at taxes .on rent, the term for years transaction is taxed
more favorably than long-term lease treatment. However, this analysis is incomplete. RE-
MAINDER is also paying taxes on its money in the bank. The term for years transaction
results in less rent, but more interest, as REMAINDER gets the rent earlier in the term for
years transaction, so that the rent is in the bank longer, generating more interest. In fact,
the term for years transaction results in the identical amount of taxable income (in pre-tax
present value terms) as the long-term lease, but that income is taxed earlier in the term for
years transaction, so that the term for years transaction results in a greater total after-tax
present value of taxes.
This net overtaxation can be avoided if PIH and REMAINDER buy their interests simul-
taneously from a third party, although the mistaxation of income as between the parties
cannot. See Kwall, supra note 153, at 27-28. The instant proposal would eliminate this silly
benefit to tax planning.
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can be calculated easily by subtracting the price for which the term
for years was sold from the current value of the entire property;
the expected value of the remainder at the end of the term can be
calculated by adjusting the current value of the entire property for
expected economic depreciation over the term. Thus, this regime
really just applies the proposal above to the "prepaid rent" in the
term for years transaction. It does not seem unwieldy. At the end
of the term, REMAINDER's basis in the property would be its ex-
pected value (15.36 in the example). A purchaser of the remainder
from REMAINDER would be taxed similarly.
Overtaxation of REMAINDER under current law might be de-
fended as an in terrorem rule that prevents the creation of hard-
to-tax remainders. 6 5 This might have been a valid argument ten
years ago. Recent legislation has applied the basic loan concepts
used here to so many transactions, including the coupon stripping
transactions that so closely resemble the sale of a term for years
transaction, 66 that adding one more application of these concepts
does not seem beyond the pale. Reform of the taxation of RE-
MAINDER and any recipient of prepaid rent,' seems appropri-
ate. This also would eliminate any question of whether the pur-
chaser of a remainder should be allowed any depreciation, with no
offsetting income, during the period of the term for years."6 8
3. Realization
Current law, as noted above, treats the sale of a term for years
by the owner of the entire property as a prepaid rent transaction
that does not involve a realization.' 69 The proposed reform rejects
this view and adopts a carve-up-of-the-property approach for de-
preciation and related purposes. While it frequently is advisable to
16 Cf. William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence M. Stone, Federal
Income Taxation 884 (8th ed. 1990) (current law might be appropriate to prevent creation of
undertaxed remainders).
'" See 1984 Bluebook, supra note 24, at 110-27.
167 Many prepayments, not just prepaid rent, are overtaxed compared to economic and
financial accounting. Surrey, supra note 96, at 621-31. Thus, an argument can be made that
reform of the taxation of prepaid rent should be deferred pending reform of the taxation of
all prepayments. Cf. supra note 2.
,' See, e.g., Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764 (1977) (no de-
preciation). Robinson argues that depreciation should be allowed. Robinson, supra note 99,
at 5.12[1].
"' See supra Part IV.A.2.
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take different views of a transaction for realization and other pur-
poses, as above with regard to leases,' adopting the same view for
these purposes makes sense here. In particular, current law's no-
realization approach would be unjustifiably generous here in light
of the basis recovery, as opposed to immediate taxation of rent,
provided in the proposal. A carve-up view seems appropriate for
realization purposes.
Under a carve-up approach, a seller of a term for years would be
treated as dividing the property into two properties: the term for
years and the remainder. The total basis in the entire property
would be allocated between the newly-created properties propor-
tionately to their respective then fair market values. Gain or loss
on the term for years equal to the amount realized less the basis
allocated it would be recognized.17 ' There would be no immediate
realization with respect to the remainder. At the outset, the re-
mainder would have a basis equal to the portion of the total basis
allocated to it, so that its basis would be less than its value by the
unrealized portion of the total gain. Applying the basic proposal,
the basis of the remainder would be increased as the owner is
taxed on hidden interest.172 This merely reflects the increase in
value of the remainder as the time of outright ownership comes
closer. No tax event will occur at the end of the term for years.
Consequently, when the term for years ends and the remainder be-
comes outright ownership, the property's basis at the outset plus
taxed hidden interest (i.e., adjusted basis) still would be less than
its value at the outset plus hidden interest (i.e., the expected value
at such time) by exactly the amount of gain or loss not taxed when
the term for years was sold. Thus, the gain or loss not taxed when
the term was sold can be taxed when the now-vested remainder is
disposed of or depreciated. This regime makes sense.173
These carve-up rules suggested for sales of terms for years result
in partial immediate realization in the covered transactions,
,70 See supra Part II.B.
.7 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a). The basic calculations are done with regard to Table XVIII.
See infra Table XVIII and associated discussion. The only unclear fact, the property's value,
can .be estimated with the Value Formula.
17' This basis would be increased over time to reflect the taxation of hidden interest, as
discussed in connection with Table XVII.
' This regime was described in more detail in connection with Table XVII. See supra
Part IV.A.2.
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whereas in the proposed reform for the parallel lease transactions
suggested above a different amount of gain is taxed on a deferred
basis.' 74 This is troubling, as the realization rules for all of these
transactions should be similar. Nevertheless, the realization rule
for leases set out above is attractive, as it is not a radical departure
from current law and is workable. The proposal does do somewhat
better than current law in treating leases and sales of terms for
years similarly, as the proposal speeds up realization in leases com-
pared to current law,' 75 and therefore somewhat reduces the differ-
ence between the realization rules for leases and sales of terms for
years.
If one is troubled by the difference between the realization rules
for leases and sales of terms for years, the proposal can be modi-
fied to radically reduce the difference. There does not seem to be
any reason to treat sales of terms for years like leases for realiza-
tion purposes. It is possible to conform the rules for leasing to
those for terms for ,years. Such rules would tax the lessor on the
portion of the total gain that the current value of the leasehold is
of the current value of the entire property.17 The stated rent could
be treated as payments on an installment obligation to which the
installment reporting rules could apply, after converting an appro-
priate portion of the rent/principal to interest, as current law does
with deferred payment transactions that do not state adequate in-
terest. 17 17 Tough rules for determining the real lease term would be
required.'78 The lessor's basis in the remainder at the end of the
17a See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
' This is recommended in Joyce and Del Cotto, supra note 153, at 185-89. For an inter-
esting early work that concludes that this bifurcation generally is the better view, see Frank
M. Keesling, Conflicting Conceptions of Ownership in Taxation, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 866, 869-70
(1956). The Value Formula can be used to approximate the value of the carved up property.
I.R.C. §§ 453, 483, 1272-75; see also Halperin, supra note 54, at 535-38. The install-
ment obligation implicit in this gain proration does not reflect the value of the residual as in
the general loan proxy. The loan proxy had to reflect the residual in order to assure that the
total economic interest on the total investment in the machine was taken into account. Us-
ing that loan proxy here would have the effect of taxing all of the gain. The recommended
allocation by cash payments is consistent with taxing only part of the gain and is in the
spirit of installment reporting - spreading the tax out over the cash payments. An even
simpler rule is possible: prorating gain by stated rent. This, in effect, prorates gain without
regard to the actual sale price, but is otherwise no more arbitrary than the proration sug-
gested in the text.
The proposed reform avoided this problem with regard to rent taxation with an inter-
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lease would be the expected fair market value reduced by any un-
realized gain. 7 9 For purposes of applying the reforms of the taxa-
tion of rent proposed above, market values would be used. Thus,
the lessee would be unaffected by the lessor's tax treatment. The
lessee's depreciation would be determined on the basis of the prop-
erty's fair market value at lease commencement.
This is best illustrated with an example. Consider the basic facts
and assumptions of Table VIII. The applicable federal rate can be
used to value the property and the interests created in the prop-
erty. At the beginning of Year 1, the leasehold represents 68.9% of
the property's value. 21.18, the present value at 10% of the stated
rent of 5.59 per year for five years, is 68.9% of the total value of
30.72. The lessor would be treated as selling 68.9% of the machine,
realizing 68.9% of the total gain, or 6.89 of gain out of the total
gain of 10.00, leaving the 3.11 gain attributable to the residual un-
realized. If installment reporting is available, the lessor would be
treated as follows:
TABLE XVIII
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lease Prncpal of % of
Year Income Instll.Obl Principal Gain
1 3.07 3.47 16.4% 1.13
2 2.82 3.82 18.0 1.24
3 2.54 4.20 19.8 1.36
4 2.24 4.62 21.8 1.50
5 1.90 5.08 24.0 1.65
21.18 100.0% 6.89
The lessor would be taxed on the second column, from Table VI,
as a proxy for rent plus interest less depreciation. The gain would
est rate ceiling, as discussed in Part I.B.4. Unfortunately, because of the elusive nature of
realization, no reform deals perfectly with all the realization problems presented by options.
These problems arise in many transactions not involving leases. See, e.g., 1984 Bluebook,
supra note 24, at 301-24 (stock options). Fortunately, rules are required here only with re-
gard to lessor or lessee options to renew. Leases coupled with options to buy also present
realization problems. These problems are little different from the normal realization
problems presented by an option, however, and thus are beyond the scope of this Article.
Consequently, realization rules for leases coupled with options to buy are not considered
here.
"I This is the basis allocated to the residual at the outset plus the discount on the
residual implicitly taxed through the rent tax regime. See supra note 172.
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be taxed by treating the stated rent (5.59 per year) as payments on
an installment obligation that provides for no interest. Thus, it is
necessary to determine the tax principal payments in this obliga-
tion by backing out hidden interest; since interest already is taxed
in the rent proxy, the back-out here is solely for purposes of taxing
gain. As shown in the third column, this tax principal portion of a
payment for a given year is determined by subtracting 10% inter-
est on the balance of the entire obligation (21.18 plus 10% interest
less payments) from the stated rent of 5.59 per year. The total gain
of 6.89 would be reported proportionately to these payments of tax
principal, as shown in the fifth column. At the end of the lease, the
lessor would have property worth 15.36 with a basis of 12.25
(15.36-3.11), so that the 3.11 of gain not realized as a result of the
lease will be realized in the future. 8 ' The lessee is unaffected by
the lessor's accounting.
This regime is attractive. The seller is taxed on the portion of
the value to which it has transferred market risk. Installment re-
porting softens any liquidity problems from accelerated realization.
Long-term leases and sales of terms for years are treated similarly.
Loss realization in leasing transactions presents additional con-
cerns. The stakes are reversed between the taxpayer and the gov-
ernment. With gain, the taxpayer usually wants nonrealization,
while, with loss, the taxpayer usually wants realization. Current
law contains rules that provide non-recognition of loss on transac-
tions driven by a desire to trigger the tax loss without really chang-
ing the investment."' A sale-leaseback clearly raises such con-
cerns. '82 More broadly, loss realization concerns also arguably
,So The 12.25 also can be viewed as the 6.43 of basis allocated to the residual in Year 1
(31.1% of the original basis of 20.72) increased by the 5.82 of discount taxed in Years 1
through 5.
"' Most prominently, I.R.C. § 1031.
... Current law contains byzantine rules that limit losses by seller/lessees in sale-
leasebacks. See Louis A. Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow Sound When Tapped?,
37 Tax L. Rev. 1, 10-14 (1981). If the rules suggested above for gain realization were applied
to loss realization, the seller/lessee would realize only the loss attributable to the remainder
immediately. The loss attributable to the lease term would be spread over the term through
extra "rent" deductions under the loan treatment proxy. No loss would be allowed in in-
stallment-sale sale-leasebacks. If this regime is viewed as overly generous, no loss need be
allowed until the end, of the lease term, with perhaps an exception for de minimis
leasebacks. Cf. Accounting for Sales with Leasebacks, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 28, 3, 10, 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Board 1979) (de minimis excep-
tion from general rules for financial accounting for personal property sale-leasebacks).
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require that the realization rules suggested above that treat a lease
like a sale of a term for years not apply to loss realization, since,
otherwise, these rules would allow a lessor to realize any loss at-
tributable to the lease term immediately. 183 The immediate partial
realization rule could be limited to gains. 8 "
4. Application of Accelerated Depreciation
The regime suggested above for sales of terms for years can be
adapted easily to take account of non-economic accelerated depre-
ciation. If lessors generally are allowed the preference, as under
current law, it might be appropriate to give similar benefits to
holders of remainders, since they resemble lessors. Under the pro-
posal, this would be done by allowing the holder of a remainder in
property to which the preference applies a depreciation deduction
each year equal to the amount by which the preferential deprecia-
tion exceeds economic depreciation for that year. However, it
might be inappropriate to give the preference to holders of remain-
ders, even in a world where lessors generally enjoy a depreciation
preference, since lessors, or at least non-leveraged lessors, usually
have a greater investment than holders of remainders. In a world
where lessees generally enjoy the preference, it. seems pretty clear
that holders of terms for years should. Under the proposal, a term
for years holder simply would use the preferential method of de-
preciation, with a recapture, if needed, at the end of the term.
B. Sale of Remainder
It is interesting to consider a transaction similar to the sale of a
term for years just considered: the sale of a remainder interest by
an outright owner. The basic rules for sales of terms for years just
described also should apply to these additional transactions. This
would eliminate the question under current law of whether an
owner of nondepreciable land that sells a remainder is allowed to
The parallel issue under financial accounting is the use of sale-leasebacks to create a reali-
zation event so that the seller can book profit. See FASB 13, supra note 51, at 107. Basi-
cally, financial accounting follows a pro rata rule. See FASB 13, supra note 51, at 33.
Different rules apply to real estate transactions. See FASB 98, supra note 55, at 7-13.
183 Installment reporting could not apply. I.R.C. § 453(a).
' Cf. I.R.C. § 311 (gain, but not loss, taxed to corporation on dividend-like distribution
of property to shareholders).
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depreciate its remaining term for years. '
As to realization, the current treatment of sales of remainders is
unclear. 8 6 Rules similar to those proposed for sales of terms for
years seem advisable. The seller would allocate basis between the
sold remainder and the retained term and recognize gain or loss on
the remainder, with the remaining gain or loss taxed through the
operation of the proposal, much like in Table VIII.
A seller/lessee in a sale-leaseback resembles a seller of a remain-
der. It might be desirable to conform the treatment of such a seller
to the treatment of an owner that sells a remainder, even if the
treatment of leases generally does not conform to the treatment of
sales of terms for years. Under this approach, the total purchase
price and the property's basis would be allocated between the pre-
sent value of the sold remainder and the retained term (the pre-
sent value of the rent), with only the gain attributable to the re-
mainder realized immediately. The unrealized gain attributable to
the lease term would be taxed through proportionately reduced
seller/lessee depreciation deductions.'87
C. Sales with Retained Use
Consider an owner of a property that sells the property, but re-
tains the right to use it for some period. This transaction can be
viewed as either the sale of the remainder or as a sale of the entire
property with a leaseback, with the implicit rent being prepaid
through a hidden reduction in the sale price. Current law respects
... When an outright owner sells a remainder to a related person, the owner is allowed no
depreciation or amortization. I.R.C. § 167(r). Otherwise, the law is unclear, particularly with
regard to term interests in depreciable property. See Rolf Auster, Amortizing Life Estates
After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, 68 Taxes 459, 459-69 (1990); Walter J. Blum,
Amortization of a Retained Terminable Interest After Transfer of a Remainder, 62 Taxes
211, 211-19 (1984).
,80 See supra note 185.
A sale-leaseback frequently involves payment of the sale price with an installment
obligation of the buyer/lessor that the seller/lessee accounts for under the installment
method. In order to apply installment reporting under sale-of-the-remainder treatment, the
note must be allocated between the sold remainder and the retained possessory interest.
The easiest way to do this would be to prorate each payment proportionately to the respec-
tive interest's fair market value on the sale day; all this while the gain with regard to the
term also is being spread over the same payments. Perhaps it is best to treat a sale-lease-
back involving installment reporting just in accordance with its terms for gain realization
purposes.
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both views.188 Sale-leaseback treatment generally results in higher
taxes: an immediate tax on the buyer/lessor on the deemed prepaid
rent, offset somewhat by depreciation over the period of retained
use, and an immediate tax to the seller/lessee on all gain.189
A confused body of law demarcates the line between the two
treatments.19 ° Under the instant analysis, the two treatments
should - and would - be taxed essentially the same, eliminating
the significance of this line. Sale of the remainder treatment would
result in the seller having a depreciable term and in the buyer hav-
ing an appreciating remainder. A sale-leaseback would be treated
essentially the same. The seller would have deductible economic
rent offset by implicit interest, which difference would equal eco-
nomic depreciation of the term for years. 191 The buyer would have
economic rent reduced by implicit interest and economic deprecia-
tion, which difference would equal economic appreciation of the
remainder.192 The realization rules would be similar.1 93
V. INFLATION
The discussion thus far has assumed that there is no inflation.
Inflation complicates matters considerably, but with little change
in the conclusions.
Inflation represents a decline in economic value of the dollar. It
causes the tax system to mismeasure income, as compared to eco-
nomic income, to the extent that any item on the current return is
not measured in current dollars. For example, income is overstated
*when gross income measured in terms of a large number of the
current cheap dollars is offset by depreciation deductions mea-
sured in terms of fewer, but more valuable, old dollars. Inflation
poses a problem for the taxation of income from capital through-
out the tax system. Here, it affects how one determines economic
rent, economic interest, and economic depreciation. Current law
'88 See Del Cotto, supra note 182, at 15-18; Ronald A. Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transac-
tions of Real Property - A Proposal, 30 Tax Law. 701, 704-14 (1972).
"' Also, there are arguments that depreciation is available to both the buyer and the
seller under sale of remainder treatment, making that treatment even more attractive. See
supra notes 168, 185.
,"0 See supra notes 168, 185.
..1 See supra Part IV.A.1 (specifically, Table XIV and associated discussion).
192 Id.
183 See supra Part IV.A.3.
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takes little explicit account of the mismeasurement of income at-
tributable to inflation.'94
Any reform that fine-tunes the tax law for inflation across the
board should apply to the taxation of rent and related concerns
discussed here. The suggested reforms are no more difficult to in-
dex for inflation than is current law. For example, whatever
method is devised for indexing borrowings would apply to the loan
treatment suggested above for long-term leases. This would not
provide a preference for leased property, as. any broad-based re-
form also would provide parallel indexation for depreciation on as-
sets that are not leased.
Problems are presented if indexation is not provided across the
board. The purposes underlying the limited indexation must be
scrutinized to determine how they affect the instant analysis. For
example, current law's non-economic depreciation can be viewed as
an ad hoc inflation adjustment for depreciable property.195 This in-
dexation does not apply to loans, notwithstanding that loans are
every bit as affected by inflation as investments in depreciable
property. Thus, under an ad hoc inflation adjustment view of non-
economic accelerated depreciation, the instant loan proxy for tax-
ing economic rent could be troubling if no adjustment for acceler-
ated depreciation for the lessor is provided, since this regime
would deny the ad hoc indexation to an owner of depreciable prop-
erty. Conversely, if one views a long-term lease as a loan, such a
denial of accelerated depreciation benefits for the lessor would be
preferable to current law, as it would treat leases like loans. Simi-
lar analyses apply to accelerated depreciation for lessees. These
possibilities are not worth much consideration, since a limited in-
flation adjustment does not improve the accuracy of the tax sys-
tem, but merely provides a preference for covered assets, and, thus,
is misguided. '96
See generally Henry J. Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in In-
flation and the Income Tax 1 (Henry J. Aaron ed. 1976). Current law does reflect the impact
of inflation on the rate structure, standard deduction, and personal exemptions. I.R.C. §§
l(f), 63(c)(4), 151(d)(3).
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1985).
I" 1 Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness,
Simplicity, and Economic Growth 17-18, 27-28 (1984).
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VI. THE CAPITAL GAINS PREFERENCE
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990197 had the ef-
fect of enacting a small capital gains preference for individuals."' 8
While the statutory marginal rate of tax on individuals can be as
high as 31%, net long-term capital gains are taxed at a maximum
marginal statutory rate of 28%.'1" The questions arise as to (a)
what income involved in the transactions discussed in the Article
should be allowed this special treatment, 00 and (b) whether the
presence of this preference affects any of the conclusions reached
above.
It is most difficult to demarcate the scope of the preference,
since Congress only vaguely articulated its purposes.2 ' The best
that can be done is to allow the preference with regard to items
vaguely economically similar to items for which the preference
clearly is allowed.
Since rent generally is ordinary income, the rent proxy under the
proposal also should be so treated. While, in theory, any unrealized
gain or loss that is taxed through the loan proxy0 2 should be capi-
tal, it seems prudent to follow current law and not break this gain
or loss out of the basic rules for rent taxation in order to give it
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 1388, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
..8 Id. at § 11101. Prior law had provided a 28% maximum capital gain rate if the highest
explicit rate, ignoring surtaxes, phase-outs, and the like, was above 28%, but the highest
explicit rate was 28%, so this provision had no effect. I.R.C. § 1(j) (1989). It was only when
the highest rate was raised to 31% that this provision began having an impact.
' I.R.C. § 1. The real marginal rate can be higher, as capital gains increase adjusted
gross income, which can have the effect of reducing the amount of certain deductions, in-
cluding some deductions that otherwise would be allowed against income taxed at 31%.
I.R.C. §§ 62, 67, 68, 151(d)(3), 165(h)(2), 213(a).
.0. Issues also are presented as to what losses should be treated as capital losses, the
deductibility of which is limited for both individuals and corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 165(f),
1211, 1212. These issues seem so remote from the focus of this Article that they are not
considered here.
"'1 The legislative history of the House version of the 1990 legislation expresses an intent
to encourage realizations by lowering the tax on such transactions. Ways and Means Demo-
cratic Alternative Budget Reconciliation Agreement, CCH Std. Fed. Tax Rep. No. 46, 16
(1990), but the House bill and the final act do not apply to all realizations or even to all
realizations of assets held for some time. Thus, it is hard to make much use of this Congres-
sional purpose. The legislative history of the latent 28% maximum rate also suggests a con-
cern to encourage realizations. S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986); H.R. Rep.
No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1985).
02 This is discussed in Part II.
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separate treatment, as the associated complexity would undermine
the simplicity that motivated taxing gain or loss through the proxy
in the first place. The income hidden in a remainder described in
Part IV is not realized gain for which the preference is appropriate.
The realization transactions discussed in Part IV are better can-
didates for the preference. A seller of a term for years or a remain-
der would be treated as selling part of the property. Presumably,
this partial sale should be allowed any capital gain treatment that
would be allowed on a sale of the entire property. Similarly, the
gain (but only such gain) that is taxed if a long-term lease is
treated like a part sale, as explained in connection with Table
XVIII, should be allowed whatever capital gain treatment would
be allowed on a sale of the entire property. In both cases, the rele-
vant holding period would be the holding period of the entire
property.
A lessee that sells its lease or is paid to cancel the lease is al-
lowed capital gain treatment under current law.2"3 This does not
seem clearly wrong. Any such preference reduces the potential
overtaxation of lease sale transactions if the buyer is not allowed
an immediate deduction, as discussed in Part II.C, above, and
makes deferred deduction treatment more attractive. The question
then arises as to payments received by a new lessee to assume a
lease or by a lessor to cancel a lease. Under current law, these
amounts are treated as ordinary income.20 In the case of a new
lessee, capital gain treatment might make it easier to defer the
payor's deduction. As to a lessor's receipt of a lease cancellation
payment, it is hard to accept current law's capital gain treatment
when a lessee is bought out without also allowing capital gain
treatment to a bought-out lessor.
The presence of non-economic accelerated depreciation does not
change matters.2 5 With a capital gains preference, it is possible to
devise rules for the taxation of realizations that work with the de-
preciation preference somewhat better than above in Part III, i.e.,
that cause realizations to impact less on the value of the deprecia-
tion preference. The sale of an asset need not increase the tax on
the asset, since the low capital gains tax need not exceed the pre-
I.R.C. § 1241.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b).
2o5 This discussion is based on the articles cited supra note 143.
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sent value of the buyer's new deductions. Current law does not do
this, however. It taxes gain on the sale of depreciable personal
property that might otherwise be capital gain as ordinary recap-
ture income to the extent of past depreciation, so that only gain
over the historical cost is allowed the capital gains preference."°'
This recapture assures that an asset sale does not effect a net re-
duction in taxes because the seller's low capital gains tax is smaller
than the buyer's future new depreciation deductions. Unfortu-
nately, current law's recapture probably generally results in a tax
on the seller that exceeds the present value of the buyer's new de-
ductions, which is overkill. Thus, since current law's rules for tax-
ing realizations and capital gains work so poorly, there is no real
guidance on how to tax the transactions of interest here. The rules
most consistent with the tough spirit of current law would provide
that a taxpayer (allowed an accelerated depreciation method under
the proposal 0 7) who otherwise would realize a capital gain is sub-
ject to ordinary income recapture of all prior depreciation up to
the gain realized. The same tough spirit suggests that, in the case
of a sale of a remainder or a term for years by an outright owner,
all depreciation should be subject to recapture, and not just some
share of the total recapture allocated somehow to the portion of
the property viewed as sold, but this is problematic.
In short, the presence of a capital gains preference does not ma-
terially complicate the operation of the reforms suggested in this
Article. Unfortunately, it is hard to evaluate whether the proposal
improves the operation of the preference.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed how an understanding of the mistaxa-
tion of rent in long-term leases motivates insights into various re-
lated tax issues, particularly the lease/loan distinction and related
realization problems.
From an economic perspective, rent should be greater when a
depreciating asset is new, but current law respects level rent stated
in long-term leases. The resulting mistaxation distorts economic
behavior and loses revenue. Reform requires applying the present
206 I.R.C. § 1245. The text oversimplifies matters somewhat. See Mundstock, supra note 5,
at 1205-14.
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value, compounding, and related' concepts used in the taxation of
loans to the taxation of long-term leases. Taxing a lease in the
same way as a loan which provides the same payments would dras-
tically reduce the current mistaxation.
Although the problem of when gain or loss should be realized is
virtually intractable, since there is no economic notion of realiza-
tion to use as a benchmark in evaluating tax realization rules, and
since the loan proxy suggested for taxing rent makes little sense as
a realization rule, the loan proxy proposal is adjustable to include
realization rules that do not differ much from current rules, and
also do not undermine the economic correctness of the loan proxy
proposal's results.
While much attention has been paid. in the past to non-economic
accelerated depreciation used by the lessor, when rent mistaxation
is considered, leases of property subject to that tax preference are
not particularly problematic. Indeed, under this proposal, the ben-
efits from the preference can be improved in the context of leases,
sale-leasebacks, and leveraged leases.
Like the long-term leases they resemble, terms for years are mis-
taxed under current law. This Article's proposal also repairs this
mistaxation. Similarly, inflation and the recently resuscitated capi-
tal gains preference pose tractable problems for this proposal.
In short, current law is in need of reform. This Article's proposal
provides a workable means to achieve the necessary, and more eco-
nomically correct, end.
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